


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Political Profile of Vaclav Klaus Sketched

92CH0923A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Czech
4 Sep 92 p 9

[Article by Jaroslav Veis: "Klaus—Pluses and Minuses"]

[Text] During the Skoda Open tennis tournament in Prague in August there were at one time two matches being played on two adjoining courts: a men's semifinal and the VIP guests' doubles final. While only tennis buffs remember the tournament's semifinalists, many more people know that a doubles team playing in the VIP competition consisted of Vaclav Klaus and Karel Dyba. Incidentally also, there were many more spectators watching their prime minister play than watched the tennis gladiators.

Vaclav Klaus is today, in a country which for nearly three years has been struggling with a legacy of communist totalitarianism, which is on an evidently unstoppable course within the framework of the Central and East European disintegration trend toward a breakup into two independent republics, a personality who from the point of view of both publicity and political power has supplanted even such an eminent person as Vaclav Havel. Preceding it was a period virtually from November 1989 on spent on careful, detailed political work presented on a broad canvas. The springboard from which Klaus was able to jump into his present role of a dominant figure on the Czech political scene was the foundation of his own political party, the only one in the Czech lands capable, thanks to both its superior organization and ability to act, of competing with the defeated but still existing (14 percent in the last parliamentary elections) communist political army.

This politician, now 51, graduated from the School of Economics majoring in foreign trade, and immediately upon completing his studies engaged in scientific work in the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Thanks to the political thaw in the late 1960's he could arrange stays in western Europe (Italy) and the United States (Cornell University) where he was captivated—apparently for life—by the monetarism of Milton Friedman.

With the end of the Prague Spring Klaus's scientific career, too, found its end. He had to leave his position in the Academy of Sciences and became a rank-and-file employee of the Czechoslovak State Bank where he remained for 16 years. This was not by any stretch of imagination even a minimally ambitious career. Here Klaus merely sat out the normalization period in relatively decent conditions. He was never a dissident in the true sense of the word. He did not serve the Communist regime, but neither did he oppose it openly and defiantly. "I always esteemed each chair on which I sat," he once told his predecessor in the office of the Czech prime minister, Petr Pithart, who himself as a dissident had exchanged his chair as a university professor at the law faculty of the Charles University for a whole number of occupations quite outside his field.

The room Klaus gained for himself he used for the study of economics and political science within the constraints the normalization regime was prepared to tolerate. Seminars on the modern market economy and Hayek's theories held on the nonacademic turf of an organization of Czech intellectuals interested in technology and the natural sciences were precisely within the so-called gray zone enabling those working in official structures (though not being their supporters) to meet with open opponents of the system.

From 1988 on V. Klaus again started working in the Academy of Sciences, this time in the newly founded Forecast Institute headed by another of the protagonists of November 1989, Valtr Komarek. This economist, a generation older and an alumnus of Soviet schools, was and has remained a convinced advocate of reforming the socialist economy in the style of a perestroika more akin to the Kadar than the Gorbachev type. It was quite inevitable that their paths separated, practically already in 1989 and politically as well—the conservative Klaus is hard to imagine in the same political group with the left-leaning Komarek.

From the very beginning of the post-November developments Klaus became the engine of a team seeking the fastest possible transformation of the Czechoslovak economy into a market economy styled after Friedman. Along with economic goals he naturally pursued political goals as well. The Civic Forum, already in the first weeks and months of its existence seething under the surface with potential conflicts between its individual personalities, initially did not offer Klaus much hope for such share of power that he was striving for. The fact that he did not belong to the Civic Forum's dissident nucleus which formulated policy in those days undoubtedly played a role, as did Klaus himself, in no way the type of a Czech intellectual who in his essence is an amalgam of a Masaryk realist, Byron romantic, Rousseau idealist and Einstein relativist. Moreover, he also lacks perception of society's social dimension—a factor which always played an important role in the political development of central Europe and influenced, for instance, Vaclav Havel. Klaus, a respecter of system and standard, is in this regard a typical epitome in the tradition of a "Czech engineer," the modern version of a potential Grunder aware that he is the salt of society and within the confines of attaining his goal he is fair and just, but not overly sensitive. (What is irrelevant is of course measured by the greatness of the goal.) Klaus's attitude toward the social environment was hyperbolically described by one British Labour parliamentarian when he asked in the midst of a social conversation: "Do you know Mr. Klaus, (then) the Czechoslovak finance minister? Compared with him, Mrs. Thatcher is a social revolutionary...."

In those days Klaus for the first time managed to display in a truly forceful manner one of the most important traits of his personality, his desire to dominate. He thwarted an effort by his opponents to shunt him off to the politically unimportant post of governor of the

Czechoslovak State Bank and held on to his chair of finance minister. At the same time he immediately began to work on creating his own image and building a party which would be free from any prominent influence of the dissidents and with the help of which he would be pressing for goals about whose greatness as well as necessity he is convinced. Unlike his opponents he never ended up with philosophical discussions but methodically and persistently won over at first the larger part of Civic Forum [OF] activists and later, after it split up, of the electorate as well. His method was simple and effective. He realized very quickly that the dissident stratum was too narrow and too exclusive. The actual active base of the Civic Forum consisted primarily of those who became active only in the November days of 1989 and the following weeks. They were not people who had supported the regime during the normalization period—they were simply citizens who at that time found their own way of living with relatively the least dependence on the Communists (even though some were Communist Party members up to November) and in the new situation quickly projected themselves into new political roles. The corps of dissidents who opened them the way to political activity—but not yet power—in some ways did not suit them. In part because of their exclusivity, in part by their lifestyle and that intellectual air. Moreover, the most prominent dissidents abandoned the Civic Forum for all practical purposes already during the first weeks of the new regime and devoted their energies primarily to the new offices entrusted to them.

Those people who only in exceptional cases found essential closeness with the dissidents were inevitably impressed by Klaus's ability to get his way, his hard work, his consistency—qualities which at the first glance distinguished him from the dissident intellectuals. For this reason also Vaclav Klaus, after Havel and later Pithart left the OF leadership, became the leading personality of this group from which he later took away also his own political party—ODS [Civic Democratic Party] built on the same principles with which he won over the OF activists: emphasis on the rights of the individual, fundamental values such as the family, community, country, on the standard approach and rejection of experiment, on a traditional inclination toward social conservatism, on rejection of intellectualism. Klaus moreover was able to capitalize, especially in the period prior to the elections, on two prominent tendencies in Czech society. The first was the general discredit of any other than pronouncedly right-wing (conservative) approach to all values. It is a logical and natural reaction of society to four decades of totalitarianism and only leftist alternatives of development. The other tendency is the never defined and publicly unacknowledged shame of the Czech society, or at least that part of it capable of reflecting political development, for its behavior in those times. This relatively large segment of society did not collaborate with the regime, but neither did it mount resistance to it even though knowing that a higher moral principle would call for something of that sort. Dissent

(even though not always inspired by noble and admirable motivation, even though enough dirt and slime could be found even within its ranks) was of necessity the reflecting mirror of a bad conscience. Inconspicuously and indirectly, Klaus managed to address this very segment of society and return to it the temporarily lost self-confidence. He managed to do so thanks to his methodical and persistent approach which none of his adversaries and competitors was ever able to match. He managed it so well that already well before the parliamentary elections he became virtually the only real rival of Vaclav Havel in the contest for the number one leader position in Czechoslovakia. It was a rivalry well-concealed on both sides but nonetheless it was there.

The June elections catapulted Vaclav Klaus to the head of Czech society. For the first time he was placed into the position of a man who is not only pushing to advance his goals and ambitions but who must see to it that they are actually carried out. For the first time he is in command with all the powers, with all the responsibility, without recourse to excuses, without ability to criticize—unless he includes himself. He stands in this role at a time when the state is falling apart, a time which from the point of view of the future may be more difficult than the preceding time.

He stands in this role also in a very difficult position given by his own personality. The reproach often aimed at him prior to the elections, that he is building a one-man party, was justified. His ODS is indeed bereft, at least among the holders of high party posts, of a personality capable of addressing anything without his help or possessing own authority. It is downright paradoxical to note how often Klaus's closest collaborators adopt his diction or his liking for diminutives, his way of reacting to unpleasant questions. It is also significant that in the book conversation with Karel Hvizdala *Prvni zprava [First From the Right]* he named among the ODS personalities Josef Zieleniec, Jan Strasky, Karel Dyba, Milan Uhde, but not the current Deputy Prime Minister Miroslav Macek, Federal Minister of the Interior Cermak, Igor Nemec, or Petr Havlik. It seems that on the one hand he feels the need for strong personalities and intellectuals of a certain type, but on the other hand fears them and leaves the highest posts in the party hierarchy to a weaker or perhaps more precisely better manageable kind of people.

Klaus at the head of the strongest Czech party as well as of the Czech Government is, strictly taken, the only alternative of future development which at this moment has a working perspective. Not only because he is linked to economic transformation in a way no one else is, that among all the politicians he still has the strongest will to bring it to fruition. At the moment he is also the only positive political force which in the Czech lands deserves to be called a force. What makes the situation problematic is paradoxically the conflict between the undeniable and today irreplaceable pluses of Klaus's personality with its no less noticeable minuses.

Questions Concerning Post-Constitution Decisions
92CH0924A Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak
2 Sep 92 p 3

[Commentary by Julius Gembicky: "What Is the Source of the Fear?"]

[Text] Perhaps some small doubts were raised in the minds of even the most self-confident deputies to the SNR [Slovak National Council] before the roll-call vote on approval of the Constitution of the SR [Slovak Republic]. This, despite a long-standing and firm decision to speak that magic sentence, "I am in favor of approving the constitution."

Each of the 90 votes necessary for approval of the first democratic constitution in the history of our emerging statehood to a considerable degree determines the future fate of our Slovakia. It would therefore be rather unnatural if the deputies' consciences did not show signs of movement and life at such times.

If a person weighs the strength of the arguments for and against at a given point in time, this is not necessarily a manifestation of his indecisiveness, political hesitancy, or immaturity. It may rather be a feeling of the delegated civic responsibility reflecting the common man's doubts about the fact that the final consequence will or, in the worst case, will not be favorable for our Slovakia. And if someone perhaps expresses out loud his fears of the results of today's historic state legal actions and the possible consequences of dividing the CSFR, we do not need to rebuke him. Raising our voices and self-confident arrogance can hardly make this important decision easier. If we further add suspicion to this, it amplifies the feeling in a person that his fears and doubts have a rational justification.

What is the source for these current fears of ours? It is surely no heresy to fear the economic consequences of breaking up the federation since they are hard to estimate. This is all the more true when the Czech and the Slovak economies in the immediate stage of the transformation are faced with the deepest economic recession. There is nothing to wonder at when someone has fears of the uncertainty surrounding the future integrational relationships of the two independent state entities. Whether it will be just a customs union or an economic union as well, the plans for which could be disrupted as well by the uncertainties stemming from the destabilization of the fragile currency connection.

The agreements on what will happen after D-day are just on paper. There is more just in the form of gentlemen's agreements known only to Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar. Is it in the anti-Slovak interests to be afraid that, under the pressure of different economic development and the potential quarrels and disagreements about the division of the CSFR's property, the two economies will pull apart more rapidly and the result will be their competitive and rancorous relationship? Is it heresy to express fears about the fact that the CR [Czech Republic] finds itself under the direct pressure of an expansionist German economy and the SR possibly in partial isolation? Is it necessary ostentatiously and with anger to take off the table the fears of a possible escalation in the tensions between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority just because it would be better not to have this problem at all?

With the final achievement of Slovak statehood, the SNS [Slovak National Party] program will be practically completed and, according to the latest signs, it will look for new room to the right of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia]. In formulating its economic program, the SNS can playfully get into a controversy with the multispectrum HZDS and thus speed up its definition. The considerations of whether it might come to a generational conflict at the autumn congress of the most powerful Slovak political entity are also felt to be speculative. And what about the incorporation of the former FZ [Federal Assembly] deputies? Can one not expect a legal conflict over whether or not they will have a mandate for being included in the SR's National Council? On what will they decide and what will be their authority? Will they not suffer from a feeling of being superfluous?

A lot of Slovak enterprises have all the requirements for going bankrupt in the next two years. How is that reflected in the mood of the populace? Does this not stimulate the rise of a government system based on a firm hand and the temporary decline of democracy?

And finally, before voting, one question which cannot be ignored may have passed through the deputies' minds. Why has the Czech side not rushed with the creation and approval of their own constitution? What was true in Helmut Kohl's warning to the Slovak representatives during the funeral for Cardinal Tomasek, or that of the French, that we should not be in a hurry with any unilateral constitutional steps? Will this not have an unfortunate consequence for our future opportunities?

It is no sin to consider these questions and obviously time will also give us an answer to them.

Csurka Treatise: Controversy Continues**Political Analysis**

92CH0951A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 5 Sep 92 pp 7-9

[Article by Florian Mezes: "The Csurka Study and the Parties; Which Road Leads to Buda?"]

[Text] Coinciding with the "world meeting" of Hungarians, and just prior to resuming debate over the media law, Istvan Csurka—on this occasion as party vice chairman—threw a stone in the still water of Hungarian "grand politics" by publishing a lengthy writing on how the program of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] should look in the future. Just how large this stone is, where it is going to stop, and whom it is going to strike is hard to tell for the time being, but it is easy to guess because the study is a summary manifestation of political polarization in Hungary, and an eminent indication of struggles between various trends within the MDF.

Since we have not had a Torgyan for a while, we (will) have at least a Csurka. This is how initial reactions to the writing designated as a study—one that looks more like a pamphlet—could be summarized; it was published by the writer-politician vice chairman of the MDF in MAGYAR FORUM, to which he has privileged access. This assessment is obviously based not only on relating the nation-demagoguery of the Csurka writing to Torgyan's land-people-peasant demagoguery, but also on a seemingly unsatisfied hunger for power that emerges through the surface texture of the pamphlet, one that had previously been characteristic only of the (former?) leader of the smallholders. How else could we view the sweeping idea by which Csurka would prefer to chase away from the party all those who did not agree with him, and—not at all as an aside—would encourage party rank and file to abandon the government, if the government failed to act consistent with the mentality described in the pamphlet? Viewed from this vantage point, charges made by Csurka's fellow party member and representative Jozsef Debreczeni seem to be false: A good politician should not tell the truth, should not say what he thought, and that Csurka remained a writer even as a politician (i.e., a bad politician) because he has done so. But if, among other matters, an ambition for power prompted the pamphlet to be made public, Istvan Csurka would, indeed, meet Debreczeni's criterion for a politician, because not even once had that ambition been mentioned in the pamphlet.

Jozsef Antall undoubtedly acted as a politician in parliament Monday when he tried to resolve the situation his party, his government, and he, personally, as the head of government, have been confronted with as a result of the party vice chairman's writing that expressed Csurka's own views linking the nation's future to the MDF. It is yet another matter that the prime minister's attempts to resolve the situation were not overly successful, to put it

mildly. By this we mean the trick of distancing himself from certain ideas described in Csurka's writing, nevertheless discussing at far greater length the hostile tone of voice of the press, as he said, and criticizing the head of state for having failed to sign the proposal advanced by the head of government to relieve of their duties the presidents of the media. These statements did not just occur to Antall at the spur of the moment, but instead served as a starting point for him to assert that the activities of those criticized had (also) nurtured extremist views like those of Csurka's.

The question is whether Antall's political assessment was sufficiently broad in scope and whether it was correct. Would it be possible to sustain the claim that is implicit in this assessment, namely, that the extent to which Hungarian politics are bipolar could be reduced to a simple formula: The government is working under difficult conditions, and the opposition—together with the press that "serves" the opposition—makes the situation inherited from socialism even more difficult as a result of the critique. Critique? With its efforts to counter the government's actions. Could another likely conclusion be sustained which holds that the whole thing amounts to no more than an MDF internal affair, that the party is trying to find itself, and that in the framework of this effort the Csurka writing is only one of several attempts by the party to do so, one that ought to be considered? In essence, this is what the MDF Board had said over the weekend, when it regarded Csurka's ideas as worthy of studying. And further, is the style—primarily the political style—including qualifying, generalizing, and even personal statements, tenable, one that should urgently be changed in Hungary according to Antall statements addressed to his party vice chairman as well as to a few opposition representatives?

There is room for Istvan Csurka in the MDF—this much was agreed upon in essence by all bodies of the party that issued statements thus far, ranging from the party presidium to the party chairman. This makes clear that the MDF does not want to cast out views expressed by the writer-politician, or to exclude him, personally, from the party. The position to be taken by the fall national meeting of the MDF regarding this issue cannot be predicted at this time, but politician-representatives belonging to the liberal wing of the party make scary statements according to which quite a large majority within the party supports Csurka. This does not mean that the majority also supports the views expressed in Csurka's pamphlet, but aware of the ways in which parties generally function—by giving top priority to the outward manifestation of unity—and aware of the more or less generally characteristic respect for authority within the Forum, the bell-wether effect, the pamphlet could become an MDF building block, perhaps after polishing a bit the rough edges of the "Csurka stone." Because this is the Hungarian future, the collateral of the nation's staying power, according to the author of the pamphlet....

The MDF itself is this future and collateral, that is. Although this exclusive faith in the MDF's mission embarrassingly resembles the communist parties' messianic social violence that was supposed to make people happy, the calling to become the redeemer appears to be unavoidable. Anointment must be demonstrated somehow. As MDF leading politicians frequently point out, the MDF has acquired a majority of the votes in the 1990 elections, but in doing so they have failed to indicate that by far no majority has voted for the MDF, but that instead the MDF received "only" a plurality of the votes: 40 and some percent of the valid votes. In addition, one must also consider that about 40 percent of the people eligible to vote stayed away from the ballot box; this confirms that the MDF majority defines the relative power in parliament, but by no means indicates that the MDF reflects the "people's confidence."

This is even more so because in order to claim such confidence, one would at least have to be certain why most voters chose to cast their votes for the MDF. Public opinion polls conducted at the time of the elections did not provide much guidance regarding these issues. As the relevant parts of a collection of writings published last year, entitled "Social Report," indicate, the number of Hungarian people who felt that the MDF was representing the nation's interest was only barely larger than the number of those who felt that the MDF's chief rival, the free democrats represented the nation's interests. In other words, statements to the effect that the MDF became the majority party because people envisioned it alone, as almost the sole representative of the national interests and of the vital issues of the Hungarian people (although there was an ample number of people who felt that way), is simply not true. Political science analyses since the elections contradict this presumption and rather uniformly state that the vision of a "calm force"—that had since become rigid like tin—brought the election victory, i.e., the fact that compared e.g., with the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the MDF was less radical, or that the MDF offered a more peaceful transition to the electorate, if you will.

Voters, of course, cannot be blamed for being unable to make sharp distinctions: The MDF was not the only party that tried to expropriate the people, the nation to itself, in order to provide legitimacy and self-identification (HVG 27 July 1990), even if there were minor or major differences in emphasis. In reality, all parties seated in parliament began their functioning in the National Assembly against this "background," but one must add that in those days the rather varied, nevertheless the harshest possible criticism and cursing of the past system provided at least the same strength to build legitimacy. It appears that this one-sided, actually poor self-definition served as a starting point for the Hungarian parties (seated in parliament) from where they had to proceed to draw more complex self-portraits, but in order to do so they were forced to define in more accurate terms than before the persons and the social strata they represent today, or would represent in the future.

The stone thrown in the political water, the Csurka writing, is one of these attempts that implicitly originates from the populist-nationalist trend within the MDF. As such, it could be regarded as the first, truly concentrated attempt to provide an ideological self-definition for a party. In viewing its contents—the unspoken, but clear anti-Semitism manifested for domestic consumption, the "room for Hungarian life" shown toward the neighboring countries, and the international (financial) "conspiracy" designated as the Paris, New York, Tel Aviv axis—the writing represents not only a virtual invitation for distributing Nazi and Arrow Cross labels, it not only fuels fears that have never been forgotten entirely, and it forces not only polarization within the MDF, but also offers an ideology for extreme, thus far marginal, political groupings. On top, it is not at all certain that unanimous condemnation of the pamphlet by the parliamentary opposition last Monday also remains the same unanimous condemnation when it comes to the members of those parties. Due to the extremist character of these statements it is conceivable that individual member groups within various parties are going to regard as too little, or too much the reactions manifested by the various party leadership groups (parliamentary factions), just because in the final analysis national self-respect is at stake, and this could revive some, already fossilized, internal conflicts, i.e., crises within the parties.

Possible rifts within parties would not signal the end of democracy of course (just as the end of the MDF, as projected by Csurka, would not signal the end of democracy either). Exactly for this reason one should be glad that the Csurka writing was published as it was, providing an ideological base for a trend within the MDF, one that might be desired or loved by many—but over which not a single MDF or ruling party politician rejoiced, by no coincidence. Had this writing gone through the normal "party mill"—i.e., the presidium and the board—it could have complied with Debreczeni's requirements before it was published; it would have been tamed to become more politic, and thereby would have lost its transparency that flowed from its raw form.

Nevertheless, there is concern that this could happen anyway, irrespective of everything else. One cannot tell to what extent a supporter of Csurka would be "frightened" by Jozsef Debreczeni's television statement, i.e., that the MDF would be unable to go on without the intellectual power represented by its liberals, and that "Csurka and his group" would soon find out that the MDF could not govern without the liberals. But one could also easily imagine that the unquestionable authority Jozsef Antall wields in the party would integrate the ideas of Csurka into a more presentable form. The reference to intellectual force could appear as too little, moreover, as repulsive, because it appears to establish a conflict between Mucska and the gray matter within the MDF. But MDF members have already experienced such a conflict in the context of the MDF

versus the SZDSZ, and this might suffice to scare them away from experiencing something similar within their own party. Another, separate, odd situation arises when the MDF liberals mention things like this because—although this is not part of the Csurka pamphlet—it is quite obvious that the writer-politician appeals to the anti-intellectual "masses" (at least to serve as a base within the party), i.e. by drawing a parallel between Mucsá and intellectual power, the liberals would virtually play arguments into the hands of Csurka. This may provide supplemental support to a trend of which Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] representative Laszlo Kover said in Monday's debate that 40 MDF representatives espousing Csurka's writing would suffice to enable them to make the government fail, because 40 people "changing sides" would mean the loss of a majority supporting the government.

Csurka TV Interview

92CH0951B Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
3 Sep 92 pp 1,695-1,697

[Interview with Istvan Csurka, vice chairman and representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by NAP TV reporters Janos Betlen and Henrik Havas; place and date not given: "When Two Policemen Enter..."—transcript of television program "Ossztuz" from the week of 24 August]

[Text] [Havas] A study whipped up a nationwide storm. Its author: Istvan Csurka. My colleague Janos Betlen and I pondered what could be the message, the central idea of this study. Fear came to my mind. In your writing you said that if we were to lose the elections, genuine MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] people would have nothing else to do but to—a quote follows, I guess from Attila Jozsef: "search for places where they could serve as errand boys..." This is an admonition, a warning that one must act.

[Betlen] I regard as the main thought of the study a demand by Istvan Csurka from the government to change directions, to show force, otherwise the remnant of the MDF—as you wrote—would part from the MDF so as to avoid being crushed by the MDF. What is the main thought?

[Csurka] The truth is somewhere in the middle. I threw in this idea to admonish my colleagues a little bit, colleagues who prepare themselves to make compromises day after day, that the time has come to watch out with these so-called compromises. Because the opposite side is not fully credible. (Applause.) One has to be careful when making compromises with people who in those days practiced salami politics. Those who hanged people, or, to be more exact, pursued hanging people as their pastime.

[Betlen] Do you mean to say that the government wants to compromise with the AVH [State Security Police]?

[Csurka] No. By no means. With the successors to the AVH.... (Applause.)

[Havas] Another quote: "It is now the government's turn. The MDF must not agree to series of surrenders, retreats, media bargains, and mistakes." In parentheses: "At one time I signed off agreeing to my own internment at the Central Prison. I do not want to sign that paper once again." Is the situation this serious in your view?

[Csurka] Yes, it is. This is how serious the situation is. Once begun, the process of revising and disobeying laws cannot be stopped. One has to prepare himself for everything once certain persons begin to remove themselves from under the authority of the law, and are able to permit themselves not to do what the law mandates them to do, despite a Constitutional Court order, or, despite its finding and analysis; once the presidents of the two great institutions are able to permit themselves to appoint intendants instead of vice president as provided for by law, and to play into the hands of intendants authority which only vice presidents are entitled to exercise.

[Havas] Well, there is a difference between refusing to sign an exchange of correspondence, or signing off your internment.

[Csurka] I was forced only to sign off my own internment at Kistarcsa.

[Havas] But do you presume that the same state leaders would also agree to your internment in an emergency situation, if a wave of violence erupted?

[Csurka] But this is not what I wrote, Sir! I did not write that! This is an image, a comparison.

[Betlen] Are they not the ones who have authority over the enforcement organizations? Let's say Arpad Goncz....

[Csurka] But that's not the issue! Let's put it this way: This joke was interjected. In the writing, that is. It means that a person, the person who signs the so-called agreement, signs something that is not in his interest. This is only a picture.

[Betlen] You have been criticized an awful lot in recent days: The MDF liberals, leading personalities were rather uniform in stating that you had transgressed the limits of democracy. Moreover, Jozsef Debreczeni made a direct statement to the effect that your writings were reminiscent of Hitler's ideology. You obviously disagree with this, and you went so far at the press conference as to say that Debreczeni's statement would have its consequences. What did you have in mind?

[Csurka] Well, these were truly heavy words. The representative must have spoken these words without giving them thought.

[Betlen] He provided sufficient argument; I do not believe that he said these words without giving them thought. This is the end of a long discussion!

[Csurka] Yet, but let's not evaluate that discussion just now, because, in my view, it is not worthy of an evaluation. The way I see this whole thing, Marxism and Leninism have produced very resistant spores! (Applause.) And one cannot cleanse even the best intended heads from these spores, from this kind of thinking. This requires a somewhat more detailed explanation. Accordingly, they accuse me of exclusionary practices. Of having an exclusionary concept of the nation. This is odd. Meanwhile they want to exclude me all the time. At this point even from the MDF! They would be better off if they were to exclude their heads from this liberal pot! (Applause.)

[Havas] Beyond exclusionary policies, Jozsef Debreczeni also discovers a racially inspired, exclusive national collectivism in your writings. This is accompanied by antidemocratic, anticomunist, and anti-Semitic elements. Debreczeni concludes that all this corresponds with the foundations of Nazi ideology. Debreczeni supports this statement of his by providing quotes.

[Betlen] You are holding responsible something like an international conspiracy for the gravity of the situation. And the conspirators are the same people—so this analysis goes—as we find in Arrow Cross and Nazi theories: the communists and the liberals who are of the same kind anyway. Behind them one finds the international Jewish endeavor to attain global power, and the international world of money which serves this purpose. I will quote this paragraph: "Jewish, bolshevik, plutocratic gang. On top, it recommends dictatorial remedies for a cure."

[Csurka] These are not my words!

[Betlen] No....

[Csurka] These are sentences from the so-called analysis. That makes a tremendous difference....

[Betlen] The question is whether your statements fit this description. Or which of these elements don't you accept?

[Csurka] Well, I don't accept any of these! Why should I accept them?! I accept responsibility for sentences I write! I did not write such sentences! (Applause.)

[Havas] Let me quote to complete sentences from you: "Goncz said no to the appointment of the Radio and TV vice presidents, because the communists, liberals, and the liaisons between Paris, New York, and Tel Aviv had ordered him to do so." (Applause.) The solution: The Radio and the Television should be occupied even by using police force, according to Istvan Csurka.

[Csurka] These quotes are not accurate. I did, indeed, write in my study that....

[Havas] Let's take the first sentence! Goncz was ordered—by the communists, liberals, and by the liaisons between Paris, New York, and Tel Aviv, that is.

[Csurka] He is being ordered from behind, those who stand behind him. And aside from that, what's the problem with this statement?! (Applause.)

[Havas] There are huge problems; although my power to visualize things may be poor, I cannot imagine that Arpad Goncz has telephones of various colors—yellow, red, and other—on his desk, which direct the president of the Hungarian Republic from Tel Aviv, Paris, and New York.

[Betlen] You are saying things that totally contradict the sober mind from the standpoint a naive person. For example, the Monetary Fund is the first monster, the international world of money, which requires that the system change not be pursued consistently. The Monetary Fund is not a communist institution; why should it not want to see a system change?

[Csurka] Before going into this let's stick with the previous statement. This morning one of your colleagues asked me at the press conference how I could prove these statements, i.e., the identity of the persons who stand in the background. My response to this is that commonly known things need not be proven according to the code of civil procedure. (Applause.)

[Havas] "Goncz said no, because the communist, reform communist, liberal, and radical members of the *nomenklatura*, the liaisons between Paris, New York, and Tel Aviv had ordered him to do so." This is a statement. I do not believe that this is a commonly known fact. You would have to defend your statement in court by presenting facts!

[Csurka] Indeed, I would have to, in court!

[Havas] And how about now?

[Csurka] Now I don't have to! On the other hand it is a fact that he did not sign these papers! Equally, it is a fact that the Constitutional Court took positions on several occasions, on the basis of which he should have signed!

[Betlen] This may be true, but he is disputing it!

[Havas] And this is no proof! The fact that he does not do something....

[Csurka] This is the key to the matter!

[Havas] Could it be that our logic is flawed?

[Csurka] Look, it could be correct or could be flawed, but some great trouble exists in the state machinery when the Constitution can be interpreted in so greatly different ways, if such incidents can occur.

[Havas] I still can't grasp the liaisons between Paris, New York, and Tel Aviv. Are these spies, agents? Do they make telephone calls, do they exert influence through

informal channels? Please answer these questions, because we have not received an answer to this question!

[Csurka] These people reveal themselves only on the rarest of occasions. (*Applause.*)

[Betlen] You must not accuse a person of being a foreign agent unless you can prove it, and I am saying this not because he is the president of the Republic.

[Csurka] I did not say agents. I used the term liaisons.

[Betlen] He is an agent if liaisons give him orders.

[Havas] How could police intervention take place within a parliamentary framework at the Radio and the Television?

[Csurka] Let us begin with the president. I can also describe this the way it occurred in real life. The situation is that the president of the Radio refused to participate at a hearing before the Cultural Committee. He thereby violated the law.

[Betlen] This, too, is being disputed! There is no law that requires this....

[Csurka] Well, if anything can be made the subject of dispute.... But there is such a law! The Constitution provides that every citizen is obligated to provide exhaustive testimony in response to every request. This is beyond dispute. (*Applause.*) If a person does not present himself in response to a summons, a summons issued by the police or the office of the prosecutor....

[Betlen] There you have rules for what has to be done!

[Csurka] There, as well as here!

[Havas] How does the policemen enter the picture?

[Csurka] This is the point where I refer back to the starting question, why I'm advising my own associates to watch out. Because the possible consequence of this is that we will find ourselves in Kistarcsa. Because it is this kind of relativism where things start. In a world where you people say "no," because according to your interpretation the laws excuse both Arpad Goncz and Csaba Gombar from having to appear.

[Betlen] We did not take a position in this case. We only established the fact that both points of views had been debated!

[Csurka] But this is not something that can be debated!

[Betlen] Two viewpoints exist!

[Csurka] If we eternally argue that the law does not apply to me because in those days I was a member of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party], well then it does not.... (*Applause.*)

[Havas] You proposed a way in which to resolve the situation: they must be removed with the force of police, if needed. The police is a very strictly regulated organization. Only superiors can issue orders to a policeman.

How could a legitimate order be issued for the removal of the presidents from their offices, people who had been confirmed in their positions by the president of the Republic?

[Csurka] Not this way, of course! Not now, the way we stand at present! Because if a person is able to violate the law with impunity, is able to spit in the face of a National Assembly committee, and if all this remains without consequences, then you, quite naturally, might ask, how I dared to think about having these people removed by the force of police. Accordingly, I am not a democrat. In a given era there were two poets who wanted to create democracy. Imre Vahot and Sandor Petofi. I will leave this place if anyone here is able to quote even a single line from Imre Vahot, a very popular person in his days, who also served as Petofi's editor.... And yet, all of us are able to quote Petofi. I will quote only one of Petofi's lines: "Hang the kings!" (*Applause.*) Was Petofi a democrat?

[Havas] He was a democrat!

[Csurka] And what a democrat he was!

[Havas] Yes, but....

[Csurka] But?

[Havas] Bibo says that claims to the effect that no transition exists from the party state dictatorship to democracy are lies. Indeed, there are historical examples. The British aristocracy, as rulers, as a power stratum that had become impossible, voluntarily yielded its power. This is going demand great sacrifices, Bibo says. Among other things, for example, that the members of this *nomenklatura* may outlive themselves personally.

[Betlen] Sandor Petofi did not reach an agreement with the kings concerning a peaceful transition. (*Applause.*)

[Csurka] But please! The transition is peaceful!

[Betlen] Well then, who should be hanged?

[Csurka] No one!

[Betlen] I know that you meant this to be symbolic only!

[Csurka] This is a symbol. Naturally! I said that only in a symbolic sense in response to the great outrage about me daring to propose in a democracy that those who violate the law, those who consistently disobey the laws must be punished. Well, this is the foundation of a democracy! And our democracy falls short because these people always get away with things! They always find a way of evading the law by hiding behind legal provisions or providing various interpretations of the law, and they take advantage of things for their own purposes.

[Havas] I will quote from MDF Representative Jozsef Debreczeni: "Are we allowed to steal if the neighbor steals? Just how does this thing sort out, dear Pista?"

[Csurka] this is a twisted line of thought! It seems witty, but this is not the way things are. That's not the issue. When I say that we had enough of this I want people to abide by the law. He must be removed physically from the Radio if he is not willing to....

[Betlen] How do you envision this scenario?

[Csurka] Well, two policemen would enter.... (*Applause.*)

[Betlen] But who would send them in?

[Csurka] And as a result of this the concepts of democracy, constitutional statehood and parliamentarism would not be violated, in fact they would come to fruition. Because it has been proved that they have violated the law!

[Havas] But on this basis they could remove a banker or a hairdresser the next day! Anyone could be removed! If that's the case, what makes this system democratic? Where is legality?

[Betlen] Is this why we wanted to change the system?!

[Csurka] But who wants to remove people who obey the law?

[Havas] But who is going to decide this? Who anointed you to make this decision?

[Csurka] Me? The public!

[Havas] Only a valid, Hungarian court of the republic could decide this.

[Csurka] Obviously, a court could also decide this matter! But let's say, it, too, could decide. But at the level this issue stands by now, there is no reason for referring it to a court. Then the whole thing is going to be botched once again. We are dealing with a proven violation of the law!

[Havas] I propose that we shift the topic of our conversation to the plan related to the IMF.

[Csurka] Yes. Quite naturally, the IMF does not specifically interfere with Hungarian politics. But it does prescribe the amount of budget deficit Hungary may have.

[Havas] Thank God! Where would we be, were we not tied to this?

[Csurka] I have not yet heard an educator say that he would very much like it if as a result of this....

[Betlen] Does an educator want the state to become indebted? So that the day after tomorrow we begin budgeting with a deficit of 500 billion forints?

[Csurka] No, no! That's not the issue! At issue is the fact that this transformation would have required—and is still badly needed, and therefore it could come about somehow—a generation that was well trained, a newly

trained generation, that implemented this transformation. We need skilled workers, administrators, politicians, literary scientists... everyone. To accomplish this, we would have to invest an awful lot of money in education, in the upbringing of people, in culture. As long as the state is forced to implement a restrictive policy like the one mandated, which does not provide funds for all this, no new generation to implement the transformation consistent with national interests can come about. I am not saying that this is the goal of the IMF, that the IMF wants things to happen this way.

[Betlen] Of course you are saying that.

[Csurka] This situation presents itself as a result of the intervention they force upon us, and not only upon this country, but on other countries, too.

[Havas] They provide loans for designated purposes! The World Bank provides a separate loan for the universities in Budapest!

[Betlen] In contrast, the country goes broke in two years if they permit the budget deficit to grow to 500 billion forints. It will not be able to sustain itself, because of the large amount of interest that has to be paid on the accumulated indebtedness.

[Csurka] This, too, is debatable!

[Betlen] This is not debatable!

[Csurka] Why do we have this great state indebtedness? It was accumulated in the previous era, after all!

[Havas] Excuse me, we are talking about the budget deficit, and this adds up in the form of state indebtedness, which increases year after year!

[Csurka] Yes, but no capital is able to accumulate here, because the interest must be paid constantly.

[Betlen] There would have been no system change, had the previous system not created this terrible situation. It had failed because it was unable to go on with it.

[Havas] Permit me another quote: "After 1945 the Soviet army stood behind the communist henchmen, and people like these stand behind today's financial elite." (*That's right! That's right!*)

[Csurka] But please! The IMF is obviously not going to be offended if I say this, but it is a publicly known fact that they had been in contact with the Hungarian banking system for decades, with the directors, with the Janos Feketes of the banking system. These relationships do not cease from one hour to the next. They are here.

[Havas] Because we are able to borrow funds from them. With their guarantee!

[Csurka] We are not borrowing from them! God, no! We only receive guarantees from them. The banks lend us money! I will not hurt this great international institution....

[Betlen] But you are hurting it! You claim that they extorted the government to force the government to enter into the pact.

[Csurka] Not in regard to the pact. The IMF does not have a depository account at the Hungarian National Bank. Let's not confuse things. But it might be permissible to give some thought to these things in a free society.

[Betlen] One may think about it!

[Csurka] I am not hurting them, but one has to think.... But if these processes go on without ever thinking about them, about what could happen....

[Betlen] Very good! Accordingly, this is only a hypothesis, Mr. Representative!

[Csurka] Of course!

[Betlen] But you served this up as a fact! That makes a big difference!

[Csurka] No. God, no.

[Betlen] You regard it as proof!

[Csurka] Just look at the title. It says: A few *thoughts* about the system change. (Applause.)

[Betlen] Accordingly, you're telling the public that what you put on paper must not be taken seriously, these are only thought, they may or may not be true, whatever you say need not be regarded as statements. Let us add our imagination to all these things and let us think that that they are hypotheses! Is this what you are telling to the public?

[Csurka] No, no. A thought amounts to more than a hypothesis. Thought turns into strength. As Marx had said: It turns into material strength. (Applause.) I hope I quoted him correctly. (Applause.)

[Havas] Reverting to the conspiracy theory: Isn't it true that the international world of money, then the Jewish global imperial endeavor—linked with the money world—stand behind the communists and the liberals.

[Csurka] In which of my sentences do you find this *global imperial endeavor*??

[Betlen] You don't have it this way.

[Csurka] That makes a huge difference! (Applause.)

[Betlen] Mr. Representative! This wording is not included, but we cannot read out loud all eight pages. We are trying to condense, but if you feel that no such statement is included, tell us that we are mistaken.

[Csurka] Not only is there no such statement in this study. You cannot find such a statement in any of my works! I lost out if I wrote this somewhere!

[Betlen] But this conclusion may be drawn!

[Csurka] One may draw this conclusion if he wants to!

[Betlen] You wrote in MAGYAR FORUM about a direct relationship between the elections in Tel Aviv, the world of money, Soros, and Hungarian politics.

[Csurka] Well, if it may please you! I dealt with the Israeli election results as one of the significant events in the world, and I welcomed the new government that took office. I welcomed a left-wing government acquiring power! (Applause.)

[Betlen] You said that as a result of this the global, expansive endeavor was going to cease, the one that prompted things to go in a certain direction. What else can be stopped this way than the international Jewish conspiracy?

[Csurka] Well, the electorate stopped it in Israel!

[Betlen] You just said that there was no such conspiracy, if that's the case, how could they have stopped it?

[Csurka] I did not say conspiracy, I said the policies of Shamir, the ones that constantly established new settlements.

[Betlen] Let me quote: "Two sides are wrestling each other in Hungary. The national center that has a Christian wing just as it has a populist wing and a trend that is committed to the socialist ideals of the former peasant party. And a left-wing bloc, whose vocal, anticommunist radicalism cannot be outdone, but which, in the final analysis, wants to maintain the continuous rule that has existed ever since 1945. This, of course, includes a need to ensure the influence of the Jewry. But of greatest importance is the preservation of financial positions and the maintenance of an opportunity to hand down power."

[Csurka] And what's the problem with this sentence? (Applause!)

[Havas] The problem is—and I once again quote Jozsef Debreczeni—"The concept of a Jewish-communist global conspiracy is familiar. Since the holocaust it means suspicion, a feeling of being threatened, it organizes the above Jewish characteristics into a preventive strategy, Bibo says. If I place these thoughts in the total context of the pamphlet, I must say that the Jews are correct."

[Csurka] Debreczeni quotes Bibo. Bibo says the same thing I say. Is his statement all right, and what I say is not all right?

[Betlen] If you claim that the Jews possess hegemony in Hungary, that means excessive power, but perhaps also exclusive power.

[Csurka] I believe that I deduced this in my study with rather great tact and circumspection. Why? Isn't it a fact that let's say in 1945, due to the the previous era, the crimes of which cannot be sufficiently condemned, the

Hungarian Jewry felt threatened, and a certain power evolved here? And those who survived, who returned home and tried to find some protection, found that such protection was provided by communist power. This is how the AVO came about. A power evolved. A very strong power, which did not cease to exist in 1956. In terms of its influence. Its people. Its positions. It did not cease to exist.

[Betlen] You said that a peculiar conspiracy can be seen throughout Hungarian history. You said that this started already with the Galilei Circle. There is a group of parachutists that integrates itself with the body of Hungarian society, activates itself there, and always reappears in a different form.

[Csurka] Well! This is another part of this thought process. Isn't it a fact that these groups are constantly present, and that they are significantly present in Hungarian life?

[Betlen] What groups?

[Csurka] Well, the Galilei Circle, for example.

[Havas] Why are these things important? Gyorgy Aczel or Janos Kadar... is it important to know which of the two were Jewish?

[Csurka] No! That is not important to me. But I should be forgiven for starting a thought process and envisioning these things in this context. It is not important to you! This is not where the distortion is. The distortion occurs when someone brings up these issues for analysis, and is instantly branded an anti-Semite. Can't we think about these things? (Applause.)

[Betlen] One should be able to think about these things! It was incorrect not to think about these things for a long time. This caused very much harm. You are correct, except for the fact that this study contains statements in conjunction with this subject, as for example the messengers from Tel Aviv, and this amounts to more than simply thinking about it!

[Havas] This is a theory that has no basis in fact! (...) You are saying that Western democracies no longer pay attention to the horrors committed in the former territory of Yugoslavia, to the murder of children, the death camps. And what if the Government of Hungary creates order by being tough? What do you have in mind? To what extent can you draw a comparison between the Serb proceedings and a possible Hungarian proceeding?

[Csurka] Well then! I hoped that this thought of mine could be understood more easily. (Applause.) What I'm saying here is that satisfying a certain expectation—a very ugly word—became fashionable in Hungary. To conform with a standard said to be Western. This could be appropriate, in the final analysis. But I do not like this idea very much. We must conform with our own values. We must conform with the laws we, ourselves, have

established. And once we have created these, and if we have done a good job, then we will be able to move in, to arrive in Europe....

[Betlen] What values of our own do we have which conflict with the accepted values of European democracy? What do you mean by this?

[Csurka] That's exactly why I was saying that they must correspond with our own values. Because they are identical. But if we do not dare to take certain actions because we are afraid that someone in the West is going to speak adversely about us, well then....

[Betlen] Why do they comment? What kinds of actions do they comment on?

[Csurka] Well, for instance, about the things I am writing, the things I am saying. That they do not correspond, presumably, with Western standards. If Gombar were to be removed by the police from the Radio, this might create some displeasure in Paris. These are the things against which I tried to.... (Applause.) The sentence just quoted said that even if this were the case, one should not pay too much attention to these actions. The ones that are taken there. They were unable to prevent, after all, and their delay cost very many human lives—in Serbia. What moral basis does the West have to intervene in these things when this takes place in Europe? (Applause.) Because it is clear, it comes as natural that the Serbs are primarily responsible, and that those who created the violence, the whole thing carry the burden of responsibility. But those who established this world order should also bear some responsibility! Those, who for decades operated this bipolar world, and who were reluctant to firmly intervene when it collapsed. This cannot be....

[Betlen] What do you want them to do now, to intervene or not to intervene?

[Csurka] I do not want them to interfere. They should not interfere with our lives under any circumstance. (Applause.)

[Havas] But then, let's take the mayor of Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca] who should be regarded as a clinical case, Mr. Funar, who in many cases promulgates debatable decrees otherwise regarded as consistent with law, he could say on the same basis that the West should not interfere with things like not permitting Hungarian language posters for theatrical performances, because these are internal affairs. These must not be internal affairs! Mr. Funar's train of thought: The West should not interfere with the way we treat the Hungarians of Transylvania.

[Csurka] Naturally!

[Havas] Naturally??

[Csurka] Naturally! What's the problem?

[Havas] Should the Romanians walk into every European organization with this mentality, with this anti-Hungarian hatred of theirs, and should we not raise our voices about that?! And should the West receive them with open arms, claiming that this is a Romanian peculiarity?

[Csurka] Things get confused here. We have a dispute with Mr. Funar. We do, because Hungarians live in Kolozsvar.

[Havas] That's what I thought!

[Csurka] That is our business!

[Betlen] No, this is an international issue! Because there you have a minority, and there are international rules on what cannot be done to such a minority!

[Csurka] Well, yes, this is where the root of the problem is. That....

[Havas] Do we view this incorrectly?

[Csurka] Yes, perhaps. The international community of states is weak, even though it operates on the basis of well-written laws. It is incapable to enforce its words in crisis situations like these.

[Betlen] Should they, or should they not be able to enforce their words? A while ago you said that they should not!

[Csurka] At issue is the fact that some powers established this world order. Quite naturally, this must be judged in the context of history. Some are the passive subjects of this. Because they are members of a small nation which is part of this world order. They are being tossed around helplessly, because they have no say in these matters. Our dependence is double as a result of having lost the war. Quite naturally, as a result of the criminal conduct of the ruling classes which directed this country at the time. This game works both ways. I was never willing to keep silent about that. About our own responsibility. But once this world order had been established, those who had established it, those who have power to settle other things, must not manifest indifference in situations like the one in the Balkans.

[Betlen] You state in your study that the horn of the *nomenklatura* must be broken off, and that doing so is not so difficult. Only a few hundred people must be held to account within strict limits of legality.... (Applause.) and be punished under the law, and that we would see this looting bourgeoisie—left without Soviet support—falling to its knees before us, betraying one another. My question is whether those who fall to their knees should also be punished?

[Csurka] Only those should be punished who stole things and committed fraud....

[Betlen] Should those be punished who fall to their knees thereafter?

[Csurka] No, no! Only the guilty should be punished. No one else, but the guilty! No one else! (Applause.)

[Betlen] Should I understand this to mean that whoever falls to his knees is not guilty?

[Csurka] Falling to one's knees is part of a political action. We are engaged in a struggle—unfortunately not in a large enough struggle, and this is my problem with the *nomenklatura*. It holds on to very much power, as compared to those who were mandated to hold such power as a result of the elections.

[Havas] Bibo's comment applies to this: This is the price one has to pay for peaceful transition!

[Csurka] Well, okay! All right! In that case it is my endeavor, the reason why I am expressing these thoughts is that power be distributed more fairly! Accordingly, what are we talking about? About punishing the guilty. At this point we should not even talk about doing justice, but about those who commit economic crimes *today*, and who, at best, are able to conceal these in the forest of various legal provisions. But they are committing these crimes, they are acquiring great fortunes. Show me a single person caught by justice, who has been punished.

[Havas] The police reported today that an investigation has been ordered against the chairman and president of DIMAG....

[Csurka] They ordered an investigation!

[Betlen] That's how these things start! He could be innocent. You asked for an example. We gave you one.

[Csurka] But the press has reported cases involving hundreds of millions! I myself found out some....

[Betlen] Dirty things are certainly happening. But do we dispute the idea according to which a few hundred people should be locked up—under the law, of course—and the rest should not be locked up?

[Csurka] Of course not!

[Betlen] And if they have done something?

[Csurka] That's not the issue!

[Havas] But what problem would those few hundred people resolve?

[Csurka] That's not the issue!

[Havas] Let them be locked up!

[Csurka] Because at that point power will be exercised on this side, where it should be. (...)

[Havas] I would like us to revert to an earlier matter. In your writing you state that the Yalta agreement is going to expire in 1995. You go on saying: "The basic question is, of course, whether there is going to be a new Hungarian generation capable of brushing aside the new threats, and, alternatively, whether it is going to be able

to take advantage of these new Hungarian life-giving opportunities." What do you mean by this?

[Betlen] Just as an aside, I will mention that there is no Yalta agreement. No agreement was reached, I mean no written agreement. No official agreement was reached at Yalta, and therefore, naturally, nothing is going to expire.

[Csurka] It could be that only plans were made at Yalta, and that the signing took place at Potsdam. The whole world knows about this Yalta system.

[Betlen] They did not reach any agreement that expires in 1995.

[Csurka]. Of course they did. The term of the agreement was 50 years.

[Betlen] What happens thereafter, are the borders going to change?

[Csurka] Well, the borders have already changed! Except for the Hungarian borders. (Applause.) Just look around: haven't they changed in the Balkans? In Germany? And Czechoslovakia exists only until 1 September.

[Havas] To raise a border issue today, in East Europe is life-threatening.

[Csurka] It sure is. The many Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians could attest to that. Or, we could say that there are many who could not even attest to that anymore!

[Havas] A leading Hungarian politician once said in a bit cynical tone of voice, outside the framework of a report, that the Funar case with its own crazy things, came to us like a piece of bread. I believe that you may be a piece of bread to Slovak, Serb and Romanian nationalists! They will write up tomorrow that the Yalta agreement expires according to Istvan Csurka, and that therefore one has to think about living-space for Hungarians.

[Csurka] Are you frightened by the term living-space? This is the Hungarian word for Lebensraum. Did something terrible happen because I took out of the dictionary this old expression used by the Germans?

[Betlen] And a few other expressions!

[Csurka] Yes, a few other expression. Yes. And what if I did?! And what if I did?! This does not mean that I advocate the same ideologies. In the final analysis, could not autonomy, let's say the autonomy of the Szekely land represent such Hungarian living-space? Is this some new Hungarian living space? (Applause.)

[Betlen] I, personally, fully agree with you, although I know that our brethren in Transylvania do not regard this as a current issue. Nothing is more democratic than autonomy. Nevertheless the expression "living-space" carries a peculiar meaning, and all my colleague wanted to say was that it could surely produce some unpleasant effects.

[Csurka] It could be that this makes many people shiver. On the other hand, I shiver when I see that the Hungarian political language, the political culture is left untouched by us in the condition of saw dust, the way it was changed by Marxism and Leninism, and its parlance.

[Betlen] I agree. But there might be some other models, too.

[Csurka] Yes. Nevertheless, one should not be so frightened by this word, because it is a pretty good expression. And the younger generations do not have the faintest idea about the past meaning of this term, that this is a "guilty" term.

[Havas] You stated in ESTI KRONIKA that it was a mistake to mention the issue of succession regarding Jozsef Antall. Is this the only mistake you admit to have made in your study?

[Csurka] Yes, I stated this at yesterday's meeting of the presidium, I apologized. This was a mistake. (Applause.) It stunned mainly the public supportive of the MDF. It created a semblance of tense conflicts that could not be resolved.... How am I going to eliminate this mistake? I'll tell you: I will publish this study and leave out this part of it.

[Betlen] Do you maintain the rest of your statements?

[Csurka] I do.

[Betlen] Have you experienced many disappointments after publishing the study?

[Csurka]. No, none at all. (Applause.)

[Havas] Didn't some persons, some people disappoint you?

[Csurka] I was not disappointed. I feel bad about Debreczeni's unspeakable attack. He disappoints me because he has some very good writings, for example, he took a very good position regarding the president of the Republic issue. But this way—and now I apologize for the analogy—he is losing his credibility: You cannot have both Vahot and Petofi at the same time.

'More Than Power Struggle'

92CH0951C Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 1 Sep 92
pp 4-5

[Interview with Imre Furmann, Hungarian Democratic Forum vice chairman and founding member, by Peter Obersovszky; place and date not given: "With a Cool Head in the Heat; Furmann Was Promised a Passport; For Whom Is There Room in the MDF?"]

[Text] "The night of long sentences" has begun, according to a founding member of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] in MAGYAR NEMZET. In other words, the internal struggle within the strongest party of the ruling coalition has become apparent. Imre Furmann

believes that there is more to this than a power struggle. At issue is whether civil democracy is going to exist in Hungary. Peter Obersovszky conversed with the MDF vice chairman—about his distancing statement, too.

[Obersovszky] Imre Furmann was first to make a very tough statement after the publication of the Csurka study, rejecting several of its assertions. Then, a day later, another statement followed, in which you raised the prospect of not having yourselves renominated as vice chairman of the national board. Then, in a few words you mentioned that after your distancing statement you had received telephone calls and letters which made you feel bitter. Two MDF politicians, two National Assembly representatives, continued to fight thereafter, and Imre Furmann fell silent. Could this mean a retreat?

[Furmann] This does not mean any kind of retreat. I made the previously mentioned statement on 23 August 1992 in Mezokovesd; in it I indeed said that I did not desire to live in a country as perceived by Istvan Csurka. I did not fight, we did not fight, so that exclusivity be enforced in this country. I began my statement at that time by saying that it was very hot, it had not been this hot in this country for decades; nevertheless, I expressed the belief that never before had we had a greater need to think with cool heads, to take note of the relationships, to review the possibilities available to us, and to try to pursue our politics with very cool heads and to try to establish a civil democracy in this country, for which, I believe, many, many people have fought. My silence during the subsequent days may only appear as silence amid the increased cacophony, because I have made statements and continue to perform within the MDF the task I agreed to perform, for which the membership had elected me to do in December 1990, until December 1992.

Let me revert to the telephone calls. One caller said that he would obtain for me and my family a passport, and that I should follow my dirty Jews to Israel. He hung up on my by the time I could have told him to also make arrangement for my reception in Israel. Namely, I am neither a Jew, nor a Gypsy, nor a communist, but if this disgraceful thing can be done in this country with impunity, I will become a Jew, a Gypsy, or a communist if needed, because I believe that under no circumstance could the kind of Hungary we want to establish rest on these pillars.

Who Is Criticizing Whom?

[Obersovszky] Don't you think that studies, statements like the ones written or made by, for example, Mr. Csurka, fuel such passions, and that as long as they fuel such passions, don't you think that the MDF as a party should part with the idea of viewing Istvan Csurka as a writer, a private person, a public thinker, and that instead they should start out by saying that Istvan Csurka is one of the vice chairmen of the party, and that therefore he is endangering the party's endeavors?

Sooner or later you will have to confront these views, the way Representatives Balazsi and Debreczeni have done.

[Furmann] Let me correct you on one point: This writing was not prepared by Istvan Csurka the writer. This was intended to be a political writing and a program by Istvan Csurka, the vice chairman of the MDF. Accordingly, by now we may rule out the possibility of separating these two things. I should note that these things could not have been separated even a long time ago. And let me refer to the period when Istvan Elek and I were first in this party to fight the views of Istvan Csurka, and had the courage a few years ago—although I believe that even that was late—to contradict views that we believed would not serve the value system of a Hungary in the process of becoming civil, in the process of becoming European. At the national presidium meeting Jozsef Antall was the one who stated—he did not ask, he stated—in very categorical terms and very firmly that only those could be members of the MDF who agreed to represent the interests of the Hungarian people, and who accepted the criteria of a parliamentary democracy and of constitutional statehood. There is no room in the MDF for persons unable to accept any of these criteria.

[Obersovszky] Well then, how do you explain that although Istvan Csurka has violated with his study very many of the basic principles you just mentioned, or, perhaps has violated all of these principles, and yet, the presidium of the MDF distanced itself from Jozsef Debreczeni, who criticized Istvan Csurka, before it distanced itself from objectionable views propounded by Csurka. If I recall correctly the things that were stressed at the press conference, statements were made to the effect that raising the issue of succession relative to Jozsef Antall was inappropriate, that one could even agree with the economic issues raised by Csurka, while the things Jozsef Debreczeni said were rash.

[Furmann] No such thing has happened. I regard the presidium and the members of the MDF far more considered and responsible than to say anything of this sort. No such thing as distancing ourselves from Jozsef Debreczeni has happened, and no such statement was made that insofar as economics were concerned, one could follow the things that Istvan wrote in his study. No such thing was discussed. To the contrary, criticism has been expressed, according to which Istvan Csurka's study projected capitalism without capitalists and a market economy without a market. Accordingly, all this diametrically contradicts what you are saying.

Not a Power Struggle

[Obersovszky] What then is the solution, in your view? I am aware that you are very reluctant to use the term power struggle, and this I understand, because the unity of a party is very important. But a study of the weight that Istvan Csurka wrote must become a watershed, because you must decide which side to take before your electorate, moreover, before the entire society. Istvan Csurka also voiced some extreme right-wing views—at

the same time the party has declared several times that it was unable to share these views.

[Furmann] I would start with the power struggle. Insofar as I am concerned, I do not regard this as a power struggle at all; certain things could be excused if that were the case. I believe that much more than a power struggle is at issue here: whether there is going to be a civil democracy in Hungary, whether we are able to forget the process in which one group tried to exclude the other, when one group locked up another group, while the other group let that group out. This is why I felt that it was appropriate for me to announce that I it was likely that I would not accept this post. If the MDF accepts the views presented in this writing, then the MDF membership is going to be composed of people who accept this value system. I am unable to accept this value system, and I believe that there are very many of us who think the same way.

[Obersovszky] I intended to express this in sharper terms, but I suspect that you have really brought this issue into focus, because you practically said that the MDF was abandoning its traditions and goals, if the Csurka views prevailed. What is the division of power within the party? Representative Balazsi said that he was afraid that 75 percent of the membership would side with Istvan Csurka, if this issue were put up for a vote.

[Furmann] The fact is that very many people support Istvan Csurka. It is possible to win the support of many people by conducting political discourse based on emotions, but only for a short time, in my view. I am much more optimistic than Tibor Balazsi. I am familiar with the membership, I know the wisdom of the membership, and I believe that people do not permit themselves to be provoked, to be tricked....

I Am Not Al Capone

[Obersovszky] When do you think we will find out about the real situation within the MDF?

[Furmann] We will probably find that out on 28-29 November 1992, during the sixth national meeting. Quite obviously, some pro and con arguments will clash before that, and this is why I feel that it is very important—I repeat—to try to discuss this and other issues in a democratic way, and that we should try thinking in terms of alternatives and not in exclusive terms. But, quite obviously, one cannot decide without the membership. And it does not suffice to simply say "no" in order to enable the membership to make a realistic decision. We must also tell the membership why not. But we must all demonstrate to the membership what the "yes" alternative is, behind which they can rally. And at that point people will be able to make a choice, moreover a wise choice, in my view.

[Obersovszky] Am I correct in saying that if the national meeting takes a clear-cut position regarding fundamental political issues, those who did not win the membership's confidence would finally have to draw the consequences?

[Furmann] By all means. I do not want to overemphasize what I said before: After fulfilling certain conditions I could agree to function within the MDF. And this obviously amounts to a change in conditions. This is one reason why I said that I would not agree to continue functioning as a leading officer in the party after 28-29 November 1992, because I am not Al Capone. Al Capone had this to say: "I am unable to change the conditions, therefore I will serve them." I do not want to serve the conditions, I want to change them.

[Obersovszky] Accordingly, there are persons and views with whom, or with which you could not cooperate.

[Furmann] There are. I would find it improper to name names. In my view the party should function in a way so that if it adopts a program, then the people representing that program should implement it.

Christian Democrats To Become Internal Opposition

92CH0955A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 5 Sep 92 p 16

[Unattributed article: "KDNP: The Internal Opposition"]

[Text] The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] wants to serve as the internal opposition of the coalition in the future, according to a decision made by the party's executive committee last weekend at Szombathely. Party Chairman Laszlo Surjan believes that this role must be played because no force in the country is capable of acting as a constructive opposition—the present opposition parties say "no" to everything, to quote the party chairman. This peculiar undertaking is obviously motivated by a KDNP endeavor to break free from its grayness and by fear that the ministry, under the direction of the KDNP chairman, is going to be the first one to fail as a result of increased social tensions. The latter assumption is also supported by the fact that KDNP politicians delivered the sharpest criticism of the government's economic policy, and within that, of the way the government handles employment and social welfare policy issues. As KDNP Representative Tamas Lukacs told HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, his party regards as a fundamental requirement that the introduction of the general sales taxes based on dual rates, and the related general price increases be, by all means, preceded by the adoption of the social welfare law, so that the most needy could be supported immediately. According to the representative, the KDNP regards the actions taken by the government against unemployment as flawed. Therefore, the KDNP is going to develop a new employment program shortly, and a discussion of this program is going to be part of the coalition negotiations.

Discussion on Right-Wing Consolidation Effort

92EP0663A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
10 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksander Hall, leader of the Democratic Right Faction: "A Commentary on the Integration of the Right"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] No camp of the united right will arise in Poland. Here it is worth noting that it has arisen only in a very few countries, as a rule in those in which majority-based electoral laws led to the formation of the two-party system. But the reasons why such a camp cannot be formed in Poland are much deeper than personal differences or differences in ideology and political ethics. Perhaps the determining factor is the program differences relating to political vision.

I am not questioning the right of Messrs. Olszewski, Parys, and Macierewicz to call themselves rightists. But I am definitely questioning their monopoly on rightism. There is no such thing as a single rightist grouping in Poland, just as there is no single leftist grouping here—neither in the political nor in the ideological meaning of these concepts.

The present writer, who considers himself to be a person with rightist views, is perfectly aware of what separates him from the camp that at present seems to be rallying round the person of former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski. I view the following accusations as the three principal such differences.

I. Misleading the Opponent

I believe that, in addition to opposing the president and the political forces originating from the old system—which I intend to consider separately—those rallying round Jan Olszewski view a substantial part of the forces deriving from the Solidarity movement and the former democratic opposition as their opponents. Primarily this refers to the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress—parties which Jan Olszewski's camp views as opponents, presents as leftist, and wants not only to compete with for the hearts and minds of the public but also to wage against them a devastating and uncompromising struggle. There is no other way to account for last spring's rejection of the offer to set up the Grand Coalition that would have assured the then Prime Minister Jan Olszewski of a secure Sejm majority. That coalition, which would have afforded an opportunity to stabilize the political situation and continue institutional reform, was not desired by all those to whom ideological differences or resentments, nourished ever since before the times of the pre-August opposition [that is, since before the rise of Solidarity in August 1980], predetermine uncrossable dividing lines in the now independent Poland.

As for me, I view the situation quite differently. Ideological differences are a real fact. They should determine the identities of political parties. But given the country's

present situation, and certainly for the next few years as well, it makes simple common sense for the political forces accepting the market reforms and aspiring to build a stable democracy to cooperate and to be able to reach compromises among themselves. Nowadays a coalition combining forces ranging from the Democratic Union to the Christian-National Union as well as cooperation between such politicians as Wieslaw Chrzanowski and Tadeusz Mazowiecki is not something unnatural but a necessary and logical condition for effective operation of parliamentary democracy. After all, opposition against the basic direction of reforms and the cost they involve is growing. There also is the apparent both inchoate and conscious nostalgia for socialism in the economy, as clearly exemplified by the 21 postulates of the Negotiating-Strike Committee formulated during the August [1992, Mielec, Ursus] strikes.

To many people, a way of avoiding responsibility for their own fate and a reflection of impotence in face of the problems generated by the change in the economic system is the search for some "strongman" who would offer imposed solutions, while to others it is the desire to replace the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy with direct action and mob rule. These trends are meeting with real support from social groups. But they also are being quite deliberately fostered and exploited by, on the one hand, the camp of the former left, especially the OPZZ [National Trade Union Alliance, a postcommunist organization], and on the other, by groupings such as the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] and Solidarity-80. They are united—despite the differences in their phraseology—by an anti-market economic program and the desire to abolish the rules of the game binding in parliamentary democracy by channeling "the wrath of the people" against it. Such intentions can be counteracted only through an alliance of political forces that may differ greatly in their programs but are in accord on the basic rationales for existing. I believe that Jan Olszewski's camp is completely blind to this need.

II. Decommunization and "Hunting of Agents" Instead of a Program

Conservatives in Poland have been the source of major schools of political thinking. We need only mention the Krakow Stanczyks [a political grouping in the 1860's, in the then Austrian-held Krakow, advocating "trialism," or the union of three countries, Austria, Hungary, and Poland, on the basis of mutual equality] or the All-Polish Camp at the turn of the century. Likewise, the successes scored in the last decade by conservatives in the Western world are closely linked to the great intellectual labor of conservative centers. Against this background the program advocated by Jan Olszewski's camp looks quite meager; it clearly focuses on identifying former communist agents and restricting by law the influence of persons functioning in the structures of the "ancien regime." The organized political forces rooted in the communist system are a genuine opponent. Creating mechanisms for

the elimination of secret collaborators of the UB [Security Administration] and SB [Security Service] is a necessary task.

Still, establishing a political camp on the basis of such objectives, and especially of highly specific provisions of the decommunization laws, is a mistake which ultimately may promote the consolidation of the forces rooted in the old system.

An effective decommunization means chiefly the political isolation of the groupings of the former left, which engage in social demagoguery. It means strengthening the structures of the democratic state and changes in social awareness linked to the success of the marked reforms and the privatization of the incompetent state sector inherited from socialism. Yet, on these matters the camp of Jan Olszewski has little to propose, and it rather favors slowing the pace of privatization and warns against "the invisible hand of the market." For a rightist grouping such a stance is quite original.

An important reason why Jan Olszewski's camp has adopted precisely this stance is its desire to rally round itself people who are dissatisfied with the effects so far of the market reforms. And such people are the easiest to find at large state plants that are facing challenges that had been quite unknown in the era of real socialism. In wishing to win them over, the center-right grouping of Jan Olszewski must compete with the KPN and Solidarity-80 by using similar slogans. One thing can be stated with absolute certainty: Conservatives in the Western countries have opted for a totally different way of persuading the voters in the rightness of their rationale and hence also of translating into reality their ideas and program.

III. The State as the Object of a Game

Jan Olszewski's camp desires early parliamentary, and perhaps also presidential, elections. It does not believe in, and does not desire, stabilization of the political situation. It wants to achieve electoral success by appealing to persons wronged by communism and dissatisfied with the reality of free Poland. It wants to win over those who are looking for simple answers to the question of why so many people have such difficulty in "keeping body and soul together" in free Poland and who feel that life has been unfair to them, encing a feeling of injustice. It gives simple answers: mafia connections among the *nomenklatura*, "roundtable" conspiracy, machinations of former employees of the Security Service, etc.

Basically this is repeating the tactic employed in the presidential and parliamentary elections. It is certain that after electoral success is achieved, attempts will be made to pursue a rational policy. But there exist simply too many instances demonstrating that keeping a revolutionary upsurge under control is no simple matter, and that electoral promises are well-remembered.

In the present conditions an early electoral campaign is bound to harm stability and complicate the conduct of a rational economic policy. There is no guarantee that the resulting alignment of forces will be more rational and stable. That is why, if early elections are to be held at all, they should be due solely to the exhaustion of the possibilities of the present parliament.

The formation of Hanna Suchocka's coalition government and the adoption of the Small Constitution by the Sejm prove that chances for stabilization do exist, and that the political system can function more effectively than it has in the past. In such a situation, the political program of Jan Olszewski's camp must be considered hazardous. Unfortunately it seems that hazarding this country's fate is a fairly constant element of the political line of that grouping. This is reflected in the open top-level conflict between that camp and Lech Walesa, waged publicly in front of the entire Poland and assuming an extremely destructive and drastic form.

I had opposed Lech Walesa's candidacy in the presidential elections, and I am not prone to closing my eyes to the weaknesses of the presidency, nor do I believe that the government alone should always be blamed for its conflict with the president. Any prime minister who does not want to be a figurehead would have problems in getting along smoothly with President Walesa. Yet, in a situation in which democratic institutions in Poland are weak and the authority of the state has become greatly weakened, open conflict at top government levels has been irresponsible. An extremely glaring instance of this has been the statements made by ex-Minister Parys, warning against a coup d'état by Walesa—as it turned out, without presenting any proof. For reasons of state, we must explore a modus vivendi with the president, however difficult this may be, as long as there is a chance for it. In particular, this stance should concern those individuals who had enthusiastically argued that Poland's destiny hinges on the election of Lech Walesa to the presidency. They knew his well; his defects, too, which were no secret to any close associate of the president. In between a conformist policy of listening to the Belweder and the struggle against the president, there is room for a rational policy based on responsibility for the state. Politicians who leap from one extreme to another are incapable of such policy.

Thus there is no need to resort to weighty ideological arguments in order to prove that no single camp of the conservatives will arise in Poland. But the time is coming when the men and women of the moderate right should combine their forces in order to restore calm to the artificially disturbed process of the development of a political system based on common ideas and programs. Otherwise, the map of the Polish right will remain practically illegible.

Dispute Over CEMA Property Described

92EP0666A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
29-30 Aug 92 p II

[Article by Slawomir Popowski: "Dispute Over Illegally Occupied CEMA Property"]

[Text] Moscow—Seven months after the last session of the Liquidation Commission on the division of CEMA property, Russia decided to question all the general settlements made earlier by the USSR. The dispute over the division of the former Council's property (and thus, still unresolved) is beginning anew.

Moscow began by sending all the former member nations of CEMA a special "Memorandum," in which it appealed for final control of the disputed properties, only under the conditions it proposed. And so, the Russian side argues that, according to its legal interpretation, on the last day of CEMA's liquidation—that is, 13 December 1991—the Council's entire property became the property of the Soviet government and, subsequently, Russia.

The matter of the property's pricing had only to be settled, but, because no mutual agreement could be reached, it was thus accepted that its true value, in accordance with what the CEMA Secretariat settled with Soviet specialists, was about 131 million rubles. The Moscow authorities, who actually took over the building, have already paid 86.7 million rubles (including the Soviet share), and thus, as the "Memorandum" argues, the matter of price and payment has already been definitively resolved.

In Moscow's opinion, the only question that could still be discussed, is the problem of use by the former member nations of the sum of 86.7 million rubles. There is no talk of any kind of monetary settlements, nor of any multilateral negotiations. Russia, the "Memorandum" stated, does not see such a need and is prepared to discuss this with each nation, but separately.

Of course, there can also be no talk of any disputes concerning the Mir Hotel. Admittedly, it was associated with CEMA, but it acted on its own accountability, and therefore should, on the whole, be returned to the Russian side.

Finally, there is the matter of West Germany. Russia does not agree that this state, in the settlements associated with CEMA's liquidation, should come forward as the "legal successor" of East Germany. Moscow rejects such a possibility, since, on the day the Council ended its activity, East Germany no longer existed.

Altogether, this was described accurately and in a suitable light in the columns of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA by Vasilev Morozov and Vladimir Kovalev, and, thus, by those persons whom the Russian side simultaneously authorized in the mentioned "Memorandum" for a "working agreement of concrete terms and a place of bilateral negotiations."

In the opinion of Morozov and Kovalev, the matter is completely clear: "Apart from their own egoism, the former member nations have no rights to lay any claims to the property, once CEMA is liquidated." What is more, the same Russian side "has all sorts of data for the purpose of approaching several former member nations with the demand to cover expenses from the title of usage by them, since 13 December 1991, of residences and other component parts of the property after the Council was dissolved."

Well, it is not exactly as the Russian side contends. Official responses to the "Memorandum" are still lacking. Nevertheless, the "CEMA-ite" lawyers have prepared their own counterarguments.

1. They argue that there is no unanimity at all among the former members of the Council regarding whether or not the agreement of 13 July 1989 between the Council and the Soviet government actually gives the Russian side the exclusive right to take possession of CEMA property. Moscow insists on this, but the majority of former member states rejects this.

2. The mentioned agreement of 1989 does indeed provide for the right to take possession of the property, but subordinates the execution of this right to achievement of an earlier agreement regarding pricing of the property. Whereas, this has still not been done.

3. They also question the basis of the Russian contention that, on the day of CEMA's liquidation, its entire property became the property of the USSR. Nothing of the kind can be "interpreted" from the binding agreements, just as the contention that someone agreed to the pricing of the CEMA property at 131 million rubles, stated in the "Memorandum," is also false. Not only was there no such agreement, but what is more, there was even failure to agree on the question in what manner and who would do the property pricing. Meanwhile, all of this was written in the official records, which the Russian side could not help but know. In other words, that 131 million rubles is nothing more than the unilateral proposition of Moscow.

4. Finally, there is the matter of West Germany's status. If today the Russian side questions the right of this nation to come forward as the successor of the former East Germany, then why did it at all earlier—and accommodatingly—invite West Germany to participate in the work of the Liquidation Commission?

In summary: The dispute over the former CEMA's property is beginning anew and, in spite of appearances, is not at all a trivial dispute. This concerns a CEMA building with several dozen floors and in the center of Moscow, built from components of the member nations, with the Mir Hotel and many other valuable buildings located nearby. The expense associated with maintaining this property has been borne by all the member nations and it is not true that it was calculated only in transfer rubles. Payments were also made in Swiss francs, while

part of these foreign-currency means were also designated for the purchase of fittings and equipment.

The Russian side, which lays claim to the entire property, would like to pay as little as possible for it, and this is understandable. However, we should also understand the position of the remaining partners of the former "fraternal" commonwealth—for example, Poland—who propose that an independent firm—preferably foreign—do the property pricing. For the differences may be very great. Moscow contends, for example, that the true value of all the buildings is barely 131 million rubles, while the results of the experts' initial estimates are that they are worth about 450 million—not rubles, but dollars. We thus recall, if only for regularity, that Poland's share in this property is equal to 12.77 percent.

In autumn of last year, by a unilateral decision, and, in fact, illegally, the seat of CEMA was occupied by the Moscow mayoralty. There is a rumor that the last secretary of CEMA, Wiaczeslaw Syczow, willingly and without coordinating with anyone from the Council, left and handed over the keys to the building to the local authorities. He was similarly on very good terms with the former mayor of Moscow, Gavril Popov, who was competing for the building.

Rumor is rumor. What is important is a different matter. From the moment of occupation of the CEMA seat by the mayoralty, there began a quiet, covert war with the representatives of the member nations, who were still occupying their own residences. Some of them yielded and made do with small rooms. Others, assuming that absentees were in the wrong, remained where they were.

They tried various methods. Elevators were blocked, telephones and electricity were shut off. Once it even happened that the entrance to the Polish representation was sealed. "I come here everyday," said Franciszek Krok, advisor of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, who is directing CEMA affairs, "and I do not know whether I will be admitted tomorrow, or whether I will not find all my documents thrown into the corridor"—this is also part of the post-CEMA reality, of which there is not a single word in the "Memorandum."

Scale of Contamination in Slask Region Noted

92WN0783B *Poznan WPROST in Polish*
No 35, 30 Aug 92 pp 15-19

[Article by Mateusz Cieslak and Mariusz Urbanek: "Katanga '92"]

[Text] The Movement for Silesian Autonomy demanded of three voivodes that they hold a referendum which would decide on new boundaries of the region, determine an electoral law for elections to the Silesian Sejm, and stop paying all taxes and fees to the Polish central government.

At Tychy Ewa Spychalska, Marian Jurczyk, Rajmund Moric, and Andrzej Lepper stood together in accord for

the first time. In Silesia the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] and SdRP [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland] are rehearsing future electoral campaigns.

"Silesia is a place that God forgot," said the miners exiting from an shaft at Staszic Mine, Katowice's largest.

It was also forgotten, in their opinion, by Warsaw, which "has for so many years ruthlessly been exploiting Silesia and now prefers to turn its back in order not to see how this region is dying now."

"Silesia nowadays is a powder keg under which the fuse has been lit long ago," said Zbigniew Wilk of the Regional Solidarity Board.

"It is up to us to extinguish that fuse in time."

Within the small area of Upper Silesia (Katowice Voivodship accounts for 10 percent of Poland's population but barely 2 percent of its area) are concentrated all the adverse trends and perils which appear singly in other regions of Poland: obsolete industry, recession, unemployment, polluted environment, and perils to health.

Maria C. moved to Katowice shortly after the war. Nowadays she keeps saying that she is living in a cursed place. The two dogs she kept died in torment one after the other. The third was found to have lead poisoning. The windows of Maria C.'s apartment in Wielowiec face directly the ruins of a no longer operating zinc and lead smelter which, though classified as a historical relic, has a horrifying appearance. Maria C. resolved never again to keep a dog, but children at play can still be seen near a huge slag heap.

In Upper Silesia, four zinc and lead smelters, which represent the environmentally most noxious areas, are still operating.

The lead concentration in the air over the voivodship exceeds the maximum permissible norms fivefold, but in the immediate vicinity of the smelters it is as much as 28 times higher than the norm.

Dr. Antoni Pyrkosz of the Genetics Laboratory of the Silesian Medical Academy said that, although in Silesia no records are being kept of factors adversely affecting health or of the congenital defects of neonates, it is certain that environmental pollution has caused changes in the genetic code in some people.

Professor Rozalia Osuch-Jaczewska of the Neonatology Clinic at the Central Clinical Hospital in Katowice claims that heavy metals such as cadmium and lead exert a particularly negative influence on the course of pregnancy and the health of newborn. In addition, as studies have shown, the concentration of these metals in the meconium of the newborn is four times as high as it is in the mother's blood, thus resulting in congenital defects.

The infant mortality indicator in Silesia is six times higher than the nationwide average in Poland, and in certain localities, such as Rozbark, Bukowno, and Swietochlowice, it reaches 40-50 deaths per 10,000 births. The number of stillbirths and premature infants also is higher. In the Pszczyn-Tychy region, which is considered "clean," the number of newborn with congenital defects is the highest. Of the total of 1,300,000 children living in Katowice Voivodship more than 300,000 must be kept under constant medical supervision owing to acute and chronic illnesses.

Dr. Jan Stasiak, director of the Central Clinical Hospital, added that as recently as a couple of years ago nerve-cord tumors had been diagnosed only in children upward of 10-15 years of age, whereas now tumors of the nervous system are detected as early as in children two to three years old, and recently an infant six months old with a nerve cord tumor was brought to the clinic.

Each month freaks—children with congenital defects—are born in Katowice: lacking a brainpan, hydrocephalous, frog-faced, born with the intestines sticking out, or with lumbar hernia, or lacking extremities. No statistics of these congenital defects has ever been kept: Instead there is the sight of crippled children on the streets of cities.

Dr. Antoni Pyrkosz contends that hidden disorders, which become consolidated and cause disorders of the genetic code, are much more dangerous than the visible congenital defects. They may manifest themselves even after many years, in successive generations, as in the case of Hiroshima.

According to the Director of the Ecology Department of the Katowice University Wojciech Beblo, Upper Silesia is nowadays Europe's largest experimental medical laboratory.

The lifespan of the inhabitants of Katowice Voivodship is on the average six years shorter than in other regions of Poland, and excessive male mortality is a special problem. The environmental pollution in this voivodship menaces half of Poland, as it accounts for more than 50 percent of the country's industrial wastes and 64 percent of its sulfur dioxide emissions; 30-40 percent of Krakow's pollution derives from Silesia.

Director Beblo said, "Each year 70 million metric tons of metallurgical waste is created in Katowice Voivodship. Altogether, by now there are 2 billion tons in the dumps. Soon now we shall run out of places to store it."

In Katowice voivodship there are no recultivated metallurgical waste dumps on which trees and bushes might grow. All that grows on these dumps is weeds whose roots reach the interior of the dumps and serve as conduits for air, thus triggering spontaneous combustion and causing the surface temperature of the dump to reach 60-70 degrees centigrade. Any living matter dies.

The dumps have been burning for dozens of years now. Only century-old, completely burned out dumps are suitable for recultivation.

The earth under Upper Silesia resembles Swiss cheese. Silesia is sinking. In some places it has sunk several meters and in others several dozen meters. The areas in which the earth has sunk have to be excluded from housing construction. Wherever buildings already are standing, people continue to live in them. Entire quarters of Ruda Slaska have had to be demolished because the buildings were no longer usable and were going to collapse at any moment. Several years ago the upper wall of an apartment building in Welnowiec suddenly literally plunged into the earth. Following a recent earthquake plaster fell from many buildings in Tychy.

Owing to soil subsidence one corner of the Voivodship Administration Building in Katowice is positioned half a meter lower than the opposite corner. The cracks in the wall are wide enough to put a fist in. The Rawa River, which now is one big stream of liquid wastes, flows half a meter above the market level in Katowice, and any sudden rise in its level could result in flooding the downtown area.

The Kłodnica River flows 6 to 7 meters above the villages located along the Gliwice-Katowice route. Gliwice will soon become a segment of a vast dam.

Bytom is in the worst situation. While it was German-occupied, plans were being made already to evacuate the entire town, because the need to pay fines for mining damages made coal-mining unprofitable. The town of New Bytom had been rising. Nowadays, several pumping stations must work for the needs of Bytom, which after the war had sunk about a dozen more meters. An interruption in their work would cause the entire town, whose downtown area is below the water level, to become flooded.

At the high-rise housing project located not far from the Wujek Mine all the tenants know each other well.

"When we had first moved in here," the women standing in front of 10-story apartment building said, "every time there was a shock and crystalware began to fall and the chandeliers began to swing dangerously, we would grab whatever we could and run outside."

After several such alarms they got used to them, but the acquaintanceships they had formed remained.

To most inhabitants of Upper Silesia the fear of losing jobs, fear for the future of the family and of the future is more important than fear of ecological dangers. Last July unemployment in Katowice Voivodship had reached 140,000, rising at a faster rate than anywhere else. It is estimated that in two years unemployment may reach as high as 400,000, meaning that every third able-bodied person would be jobless.

"People fear the unknown most. It is an open secret that the Canadian consortium that worked out a program for

restructuring the steel industry expects to lay off at least several dozen thousand steelworkers. Yet no one has personally seen such a plan, not even at the Voivodship Office," said Zbigniew Wilk of Regional Solidarity.

More than 60 percent of the steel plants are nearing bankruptcy, and they all are money-losers, including Baildon, the most modern of them. The mining industry, which last year operated at a loss of 3.6 trillion zlotys [Z], is expected to lose Z12 trillion this year. Alongside roads in Katowice there appeared boards advertising cheap high-quality coal.

Eighteen mines will probably be designated for liquidation, although, according to Tadeusz Kieckak-Niechajowicz, deputy director of the Economic Department of the Katowice Voivodship Office, this does not mean that it is precisely the most regularly unprofitable mines that will be thus designated.

Fear of the future is aggravated by the experience of the Walbrzych Basin, which was to be the proving ground for the liquidation of some Silesian mines. In Walbrzych that experience was not good, although it contains only four mines. So why should it work in Silesia? The miners ask. "We are told that mines have to be liquidated. Good, but what comes after?" asked Jerzy Bohn of Staszic Mine, a Solidarity-80 member.

"Minister Jacek Kuron admitted that as yet no regional plan has been worked out for Silesia. Yet by now 70 percent of enterprises in Katowice Voivodship have lost creditworthy status," said Director Kieckak-Niechajowicz.

"At first, miners were promised that the cost of liquidating money-losing mines would be offset from the state budget. But now forming holding companies is being proposed and, according to official assurances, they are to streamline the organization of coal sales, whereas in the opinion of miners they are intended to deprive mines of their autonomy," said Jerzy Bohn.

The estimated cost of liquidating a single mine is about Z2 trillion, and besides no mine can be closed 100 percent, because that would involve too big a risk.

The water pumps would have to work forever, properly speaking.

Jan Kowalski, a vice chairman of Solidarity-80 at the Staszic Mine, said that the Katowice region has been all this time exploited ruthlessly, and miners were treated as second-class citizens and not given anything in return. Zbigniew Wilk of Solidarity explained that even in the 1970's when people in other regions of Poland used to say that the Silesians were Gierek's pets, the situation in Katowice Voivodship was not all that good.

The miners themselves do not want the past to return. Nowadays, they prefer to speak of their destitution: Their monthly wages are enough to live on for two weeks

out of the month and their wives must, contrary to long-time family tradition, increasingly often look for work.

"Every time we go down a mine shaft, we do not know whether this might be our last time," said Zygmunt Grygiel, a blasting worker. "We are being treated like superfluous people."

Zygmunt Grygiel has donated 26 liters of blood, yet, when he asked the mine health service to help a son who had an accident, he was treated like a pest. To get help he had to "show his wallet."

Officially the average monthly wage at the Staszic Mine is about Z4.3 million, but miners claim that they cannot make more than Z2.0-2.5 million, with the exception of those working at stope faces. Jerzy Bohn, a supervisor with several dozen years of seniority, claims that he is paid Z800,000 less than the average monthly wage, and the three other miners in his family are altogether underpaid by Z6.9 million compared with that average wage.

Miners wonder what is happening to the missing money. Who is getting it? In the opinion of the representatives of Solidarity-80 at Staszic, a mine whose condition is not so bad compared with others, that money was spent on so-called application and labor-saving bonuses (on which Z15 billion was spent in the last year and a half). During the last strike miners tried to find out why the coal cutting machine had to be imported from England for Z24 billion whereas a similar machine at the Katowice Famur cost Z8 billion.

"Everything becomes clear once we consider that the bonus for 'introducing' the English machine was Z1.2 billion and that for introducing its Polish counterpart, 'only' Z400 million," said Jerzy Bohn.

Rajmund Moric, chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Miners, contends that while Mazowiecki still appreciated the importance of mining and asked miners to excavate more coal, Bielecki preferred to write miners off as a loss.

As for Olszewski, he simply did not "move a finger" about the miners.

"As for the present government, for the love of God, it does not have any program at all," added Moric, who also signed the declaration of six trade union federations, "Polish Copper," and FSM Tychy [compact car plant], establishing the National Inter-Trade Union Negotiation and Strike Committee.

At Tychy, for the first time, Ewa Spychalska, Marian Jurczyk, Rajmund Moric, and Andrzej Lepper stood in accord. In Silesia KPN and SdRP politicians are rehearsing future electoral campaigns. The postulates of 21 August can only accelerate parliamentary elections and change the alignment of the Sejm. Solidarity, which began clearly to lag behind other trade unions, is now desperately trying to make up for lost time and

announcing a protest action with the object of providing moral support for the trade unions negotiating with the government.

Zbigniew Wilk contends that this does not mean that Solidarity fears being left behind; the stance of his trade union ensues chiefly from its feeling of responsibility for this country.

Embittered and discouraged people are readily persuaded of the rightness of the most demagogic slogans. This mood is being exploited by representatives of groupings that officially declare only their concern for the good of Upper Silesia.

"I firmly believe that together we shall create already in the not distant future in this ridiculous 'Polish zoo' our own Upper Silesian 'Disneyland,' full of joy and realized dreams," said Edward Poloczek, chairman of the Alliance of Upper Silesian Trade Unions and Associations.

Poloczek claims that the aspirations of Upper Silesia are being promoted nowadays by the nationwide "mess and political-economic chaos."

The slogans extolling partial autonomy of Upper Silesia appeared as early as in the end of 1989, when the Upper Silesian Union, proclaiming the need to recreate the Silesian Voivodship in its prewar shape, was formed with the blessing of the Katowice Curia.

The Upper Silesian Union is the actual ruler of the region. Its members include Voivode Wojciech Czech, who speaks of an Upper Silesia stretching from Czestochowa to Brno and from Opole to Bielsko, and a majority of councilmen. However, the Union as an organization is not a signatory to the Upper Silesian Alliance, although Edward Poloczek himself is its member.

The signatories to the Alliance are: The World Union of Upper Silesians, the Union of Upper Silesians from Opole, the German Minority of Katowice Voivodship, the "Reconciliation and the Future" German Work Community, the Society of Friends of Katowice, and the Movement for Silesian Autonomy.

"Prompted by a deep concern for a deliberately ruined Silesia and for the continuing impoverishment of its industrious inhabitants," the Movement for Silesian Autonomy demanded, in an open letter addressed to the Katowice, Opole, and Bielsko voivodes, holding a referendum to determine the boundaries of an autonomous Silesia, issuing electoral regulations governing elections to a Silesian Sejm, and discontinuing the payment of all taxes and fees to the Polish central government "in view of its notorious wastage of every zloty transferred thereto." Furthermore, it demands "inventorying all the material and artistic treasures lawlessly removed from Silesia" and "acknowledging that crimes against Silesians are not subject to the statute of limitations."

"This is such a difficult topic that it cannot be discussed without consulting the head office in Warsaw," said Wojciech Szram, the head of the Katowice UOP [Office for State Protection].

When asked whether activities like those of the Upper Silesian Alliance are of interest to the UOP, its head office in Warsaw answered through the mouth of the UOP's press spokesperson Irena Popoff, that any statement aimed against national security is of interest to the UOP.

The fuse under the powder keg in Upper Silesia has already been lit. The cord is, it seems, still fairly long, but it is burning more and more rapidly.

German Waste for Recycling Seen as Threat

92WN0767 Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 28 Aug 92 p II

[Article by Krystyna Forowicz: "Greenpeace Is Not the Only Warning: Poland Risks Being Invaded by Garbage"]

[Text] Greenpeace ecologists say Poland runs the risk of another assault of waste, especially from Germany. They think that the draft law on solid waste the Sejm is preparing will make it possible to use recycling as a pretext to permit solid waste to enter our country.

Andrzej Walewski, chief inspector of environmental protection, told *RZECZPOSPOLITA* that the threat is real, and that more and more solid waste will be smuggled into Poland, as other countries firm up their regulations on the international transportation of solid waste.

The Germans have rigid regulations. Therefore, we can expect an influx of solid waste from that country, particularly inasmuch as German law permits harmful substances to be exported as long as they are designated to be reused for economic purposes. Minister Walewski stated that Poland had strict regulations providing fully protection against the importation of solid waste, and he said that environmental and customs cooperation was well organized. We also signed the Basel Convention on the control of transborder transportation and removal of hazardous waste. Our regulations here are stricter than those of the rest of the pact's signatory countries.

The new draft law—it was put forth at the initiative of a deputy—actually allows some solid waste to be imported as a recycled material. According to Minister Walewski, however, the regulation in the law will be formulated in such a way that the inspectors of PIOS [State Environmental Inspectorate] will issue individual single-entry permits to import specific waste, such as nonferrous metals.

Poland's prohibition against importing solid waste and Greenpeace's claim of numerous smuggling attempts have temporarily discouraged people engaged in the smuggling business. Iza Kruszewska, a Greenpeace

expert and representative for Central-Eastern Europe, warns that Poland's current officials may bring about another influx of solid waste by issuing permits to import solid waste for "economic use."

Greenpeace considers the new draft law's chapter on the international turnover of solid waste to be especially controversial. In this chapter the authors refer to the imperfect Basel Convention, mentioned above. They anticipate the present prohibition against importing any sort of solid waste to be mitigated through the issuance of permits for importing so-called "safe solid waste." The concessions may be issued if, for example, the waste is to be used as a secondary raw material and its processing does not threaten the environment or if the supplier of the solid waste provides for the extraction/collection of that part that will not be fully processed during recycling.

The draft law does not specify, however, which of the existing classifications of hazardous waste will be used. Greenpeace agrees that certain waste, such as paper and glass, is actually safe, but we must consider the fact that many "harmless" substances become hazardous in the "recycling" process.

Moreover, Poland will of necessity be pressed to adopt the waste classification of the OECD, which is made up of the 24 most advanced countries. The OECD is in the process of creating a special agreement known as the "red, yellow, and green agreement." Each color will designate a different control method. The three colors will be used for the various waste lists. Greenpeace considers this project absurd. The green list ("safe waste"), for example, includes "lead waste and scrap," as well as plastic materials, but "liquid hog manure" has been put on the yellow list, with hazardous waste.

Up until now, Poland has been against the proposed waste classification methods presented at the OECD

forum, with its red, yellow, and green list, on the grounds that there is no scientific justification for the lists.

Nearly all waste can be considered "beneficial" or "useful" in poor countries.

The new version of the Polish law will subject Poland to successive onslaughts of "garbage." We do not have the technology to process harmful materials. The Polish ecological services do not have the technical capacity to assess the "utilization process." One example testifying to this fact is the former environmental minister's permission last September to import waste lye sulfide from Norway to be employed to produce copper using an outmoded technology. At the time, the minister explained his decision saying: "Lye is a toxic substance reflecting the properties of the waste, but this is only true when it is not fully utilized." He did not take into consideration the fact that when lye is used, there are tremendous sulfur emissions into the atmosphere. This would be one of the factors underlying the absurdity of requiring assurance that the remnants from the recycling process are returned to the supplier. Actually, they do return to him, in the form of pollution along the border.

The influx of solid waste that Poland was so concerned with in 1989 and 1990 has been arrested, owing to consistent enforcement of the law, which compelled business people to alter their routes, sending waste to Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic nations, and the countries of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] instead.

Owing to our lack of technical resources and our shortage of corresponding agencies engaged in environmental protection, and given our country's proximity to Germany, the West European "champion" exporter of solid waste, Greenpeace thinks that Poland should maintain a strict total ban on importing any waste or postproduction products.

Bavcar on Depoliticizing Police, Other Issues
92BA1431C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 12 Sep 92 p 21

[Interview with Igor Bavcar by Janko Lorenci; place and date not given: "We Do Not Persecute Politicians in This Agency"]

[Text] [Lorenci] The Jelincic case has met with a strong public reaction. As minister, were you informed of the whole operation in advance?

[Bavcar] Yes.

[Lorenci] Who actually headed it?

[Bavcar] A special headquarters in the ministry, composed of members of various services.

[Lorenci] Members of the VIS [Security-Information Service], police detectives...

[Bavcar] That's right.

[Lorenci] A special headquarters means that you attributed special significance to the case.

[Bavcar] Of course. We assumed that an organized criminal gang was involved. All the signs indicated that. We also proposed that kind of handling of the case to the public prosecutor. Clearly we attributed great significance to the case; the collection of weapons, including even sniper and automatic rifles, silencers, and so forth, the suspicion of involvement in, etc.—these are serious matters.

[Lorenci] It seems that not much has come of all this. The public impression is that it was a tempest in a teapot.

[Bavcar] That is not true. We dealt with the case professionally, and we filed several criminal charges. Several statements by witnesses incriminate Jelincic very badly. The impression about a tempest in a teacup is a product of the media attention, which has been stirred up a great deal, and for reasons incomprehensible to me has given Jelincic an opportunity to attack the police and make a big political story out of it all, even before an investigation could verify our findings. I think that we performed our work correctly, and that the investigation will confirm our conclusions.

[Lorenci] The case is thus not over yet, and you think that you did not work in vain....

[Bavcar] By no means.

[Lorenci] Jelincic claims that the whole case has a political background, and that it involves persecution of his party.

[Bavcar] We did not link these two things—his political organization, and the suspicion of criminal acts, which is clear and very specific, and for which there are statements by witnesses, and not just Lavric.

[Lorenci] Why was the operation carried out precisely on the day of the congress of Jelincic's party?

[Bavcar] The operation began in Maribor. It involves people of whom there are grounds to suspect that they were preparing to murder a person; they planted a bomb in his car. In investigating, we obtained such findings that we immediately had to carry out other investigative actions as well. In doing so we did not pay attention to whether anyone had any sort of meeting or not.

[Lorenci] The accusations of planned assassination attempts against Kucan and others seem somewhat bombastic.

[Bavcar] That is not our conclusion. That is a statement by Janko Lavric, included only in the records of the adoption of verbal criminal charges, but it is nowhere in our charges.

[Lorenci] Was Lavric a police agent?

[Bavcar] No.

[Lorenci] You consequently do not think that the case will end with all of it only benefiting Jelincic and his popularity, but damaging the police and you personally?

[Bavcar] In such cases I, who have a certain position in politics, could justifiably be expected to be very cautious and calculating. Nevertheless, there is a clear boundary between political calculation and those principles which are called legality, the professionalism of police work, etc. I absolutely adhere to that boundary, and I would not hesitate for a moment over what to do if someone presented me with the dilemma that something could hurt me, but was legal. I work absolutely in accordance with the law! Of course I was aware that the case could acquire a political dimension. I think, however, that the principles of a law-abiding society are far ahead of all other considerations. At the headquarters, we did not think for a moment that because of any sort of political concerns we would deviate from the actions that we were obligated to take by the law and by our profession.

[Lorenci] Does the headquarters still exist?

[Bavcar] Yes.

[Lorenci] Could the activity of Jelincic's party still be considered illegal?

[Bavcar] That is a matter for the Ministry of Justice.

[Lorenci] The police have to form a picture of it.

[Bavcar] For the time being we have not linked Jelincic's activities, and the charges we filed against him, with his party.

[Lorenci] Could we in Slovenia already speak of any significant signs of political extremism or even political violence?

[Bavcar] For the time being, no, but there have been several cases that have aroused attention, and we should not ignore them by any means, just so that worse ones do not occur. That is why we are taking seriously the burning of deputy Setinc's door, and of course also the public statements that armed units should be used in solving several political problems. That was stated by Zmago Jelincic, and it was also published by your newspaper. Clearly the police have to begin to act the moment that someone says something like that publicly. That is self-evident, something automatic. I think that at this time politics and violence in Slovenia are not yet linked. I am afraid, however, that the closeness of the military conflicts and a possible end to them will mean the beginning of terrorism, which will partly extend to us as well. At one of its previous meetings our government decided that it would oppose this with all the resources of a law-governed state.

[Lorenci] Perhaps, even more than political violence, one should be afraid of a Slovene version of the current events in the former East Germany, i.e., pressures against the non-Slovene population.

[Bavcar] I am not ruling this out, although the possibilities for such drastic and violent behavior are much, much smaller. There are also several facts that cannot be denied: 70,000 refugees, 50,000 guest workers, 100,000 unemployed people, and the absence of certain basic legal regulations, especially privatization, that would relax the great pressure in the economy so that some new economic boom could at least start—there are no prospects of this being done in the near future. Of course, automatic mechanisms are appearing in society to resolve these matters, mechanisms that in many cases verge on crime. That is why I expect problems in this regard.

[Lorenci] Frustrations are intensifying on all sides. The number of refugees will probably increase further, and it will be more and more difficult to keep them in the centers. New organizations are appearing, e.g., the Croatian HOP [Croatian Liberation Movement], and it is not known how those will develop. For example, Marojevic has returned. All of these are signs that may indicate an exacerbation.

[Bavcar] No. In the first place, the proposed legislation logically bans political organization by foreigners...

[Lorenci] ...Which really is logical, but not necessarily also a remedy.

[Bavcar] It is not the only remedy. In the second place, Marojevic has returned, but in view of what has happened with him recently and in view of the fact that his decision to reject citizenship will become legally valid on 15 September, we are about to initiate proceedings....

[Lorenci] He will be expelled?

[Bavcar] That's right. We will initiate appropriate proceedings. As far as the refugees are concerned, it may

happen that in the event of a continuation of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina there will be a dispersal of millions of people, like European Palestinians. Winter is approaching, and we are approaching a new onslaught of refugees. The Slovene police have several measures prepared, and will be able to stop that wave, although the borders cannot be closed completely. The scenes of refugees waiting at the border are pitiful, to be sure, but on the other hand they show Slovenia's firm determination to stop the refugees at its borders. Slovene policemen, who turn back 300-400 people every day at the border, are doing an extremely difficult job. It is hard to tell the driver of a bus carrying mothers with their children that there is no room for them in Slovenia. That is the image of this part of Europe, however, and we will clearly have to get used to it. I was one of the first who said that Slovenia had its own borders and that it had to take radical measures. I was savagely attacked for this by the left and the right. Today they have forgotten about that, and pointing a finger at me and the police and saying that it has not done this and that. If the Slovene-Croatian border had not been taken seriously in time, Slovenia would now have 1.5 to 2 million refugees. You recall all the attacks against me in connection with the border with Croatia.

[Lorenci] Are there any conflicts in Slovenia among the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims here?

[Bavcar] Surprisingly few, or at any rate fewer than we expected. As you know, before the plebiscite all the parliamentary parties unanimously agreed on the law on citizenship, as it is now. About 160,000 people thus acquired Slovene citizenship. The number seems high, but it is relative: All those people were already here and in effect already had the same rights that they have now as citizens. Essentially, in practice we reduced the number of people entitled to citizenship by 80,000-100,000, since those who had temporary residence here did not acquire citizenship. This means that Slovenia essentially reduced the number of people who have the same rights as citizens of Slovenia. One should be aware of that, and that is the first thing. In the second place, almost half of these people were born here. And in the third place, these people still have and see some prospects here. They feel that this is the state where they will live, and thus their loyalty to Slovenia is greater than if they were foreigners. The psychological problems with this large mass of people would otherwise have been incomparably greater, also with respect to conflicts.

[Lorenci] Do we have any real supervision of refugees at all?

[Bavcar] For the most part we do. We did not record some of the refugees who came here earlier, before the battles in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out. This probably amounts to several thousand people. In the second place, on the green border there are channels that we cannot completely oversee. The difficulty is that Croatia does not have its own southern border, it does not control

arrivals in its territory, and it winks both eyes at the people who are crossing our border.

[Lorenci] What is the situation on the border with Croatia like otherwise? You have already had several serious incidents with the Croatian police.

[Bavcar] The situation is not good, and too little attention has been devoted to this problem in the previous and present governments. There are several things involved. In the first place, the Croatian police are directly involved in the war. I am well aware what waging war with the police means, and what it means if the police start to become militarized. Their civilian nature, their police functions, simply disappear, they are pervaded by the war syndrome, and then they are prepared to settle all conflicts by military means. That is happening now to the Croatian police on our border. In the second place, the people who join it are not trained for it, because of the high demand for personnel. In the third place, the Croatian media, with abundant support from political circles, including the highest ones, are constantly creating distrust and even hostility toward Slovenia. From a long-term point of view, this is a catastrophe. We have settled virtually none of the main problems with Croatia, and that is being manifested now where the two countries touch. Everything possible is happening. Croatian policemen have sometimes even crossed the border, and just now, for example, we had to disarm a patrol in Crnomlje. There are many different border incidents, violating all the agreements. There is no problem in reaching agreements with their ministry, but at the local level things do not work out. Our impression of the discipline of the Croatian police is very, very bad.

[Lorenci] And how should we act? Stay calm, but not keep yielding?

[Bavcar] We are certainly reacting, but we are also staying calm. The conflicts are increasing, however. If we yield, the conflicts increase here, and if we do not yield, they do on the other side. Whatever we do, things are bad. Why? Because we are making these decisions by ourselves, instead of having basic trust established between political circles on both sides.

[Lorenci] Before Jelincic, the public was upset in connection with the police by the Koper incident, which was supposed to have involved political misuse of the police. An interpellation was submitted against you, but the government has now fully supported you in connection with this.

[Bavcar] Of course.

[Lorenci] And how will matters develop from now on?

[Bavcar] I do not know. Of course, it is a matter for parliament, and, in my opinion, the opposition's election campaign. In any case, the case has been contrived. We do not persecute any politicians at all in this agency. I have absolutely made sure of that.

[Lorenci] Are you objectively responsible for the Koper incident?

[Bavcar] We are quite familiar with those terms from the not-too-distant past....

[Lorenci] The principle of objective responsibility is a purely normative legal and political principle, and even in very democratic states many ministers have already resigned for things that they were not at all guilty of personally.

[Bavcar] The Koper incident is a case in which there were already previous conflicts between a policeman and his commander, who—completely unconnected with the political aspect—made several mistakes, as a result of which he had to leave.

[Lorenci] Are incidents like the Koper one investigated by so-called internal affairs?

[Bavcar] Yes. It is a sort of police within the police, a service attached to the staff, which is subordinate directly to me for the sake of independence from the individual services.

[Lorenci] According to what standards is it selected?

[Bavcar] These are people with experience, with an appropriate education...

[Lorenci] Is integrity also important?

[Bavcar] Certainly.

[Lorenci] Is it known in the police who is in that protective service?

[Bavcar] Of course; it is not a secret. It is headed by Zlato Besker, who has several inspectors with whom he works. It is not any sort of secret organization.

[Lorenci] That service does not have any connection with the VIS?

[Bavcar] None at all.

[Lorenci] Is the VIS leaving the framework of the ministry?

[Bavcar] As soon as I started my term, I made a clear proposal. When the VIS leaves will depend on parliament and the passage of the appropriate laws. The VIS will probably be directly subordinate to the government then. Well, this is still a subject of discussion, but I think that it should be done before the elections, and that it may be organized differently. Even now, the entire VIS system and apparatus is organized in such a way that no abuses, the kind that the SDV [State Security Service] indulged in previously, are possible, and there are also no such intentions.

[Lorenci] Does Dr. Brejc also agree with the separation?

[Bavcar] The leadership that I appointed and with which I work accepts and supports the things I am talking about.

[Lorenci] Regarding Koper, then, you can calmly assert that it was an isolated local incident, and that the police as a whole cannot be misused for political purposes?

[Bavcar] As long as I am minister, it cannot be used in political games.

[Lorenci] It is probably also becoming the target of political attacks?

[Bavcar] Of course. That is normal, although in other states it is normal for these political attacks and games to be nevertheless somehow directed toward building up the police. The Social-Democratic campaign headquarters attacked me, for example, because of the public campaign in which the police advised people about safe behavior. I am supposed to have used this to promote myself as Bavcar, as president of the party. That is ridiculous. All police forces in the world do this.

[Lorenci] Pavle Celik, a high police official, says that the interior minister should not be a party leader. In principle, he is probably right.

[Bavcar] There are different opinions. At any rate, it is a hundred times more normal for the minister to be a policeman. I think that it is not written anywhere that I will always be a police minister or party president. That is one thing. In the second place, such cases are usual, and among other things, Anton Korosec, president of the Slovene People's Party, was also at the same time the interior minister for two terms. I think, however, that this is primarily a matter of parliamentary oversight and confidence, so I am not very concerned about these misgivings.

[Lorenci] Do you think that there would be internal resistance in the police if people wanted to use it for political purposes?

[Bavcar] Yes.

[Lorenci] Why, because of a sense of police identity, or what?

[Bavcar] In the first place, if someone tried it, it would be a catastrophe, since we have just embarked upon a new system. In the second place, people in the police are young and depoliticization was a real relief for them; it meant not only that at a purely elemental level it saved a person several hours of party meetings and so forth, but also primarily that a policeman was relieved of having to think about who in his area was the head of this or that party, or previously the communist party; instead of this, he has gained a certain basic support and backing in legality. In short, policemen would resist it.

[Lorenci] In your staff as well?

[Bavcar] Yes.

[Lorenci] People are always opportunists a little, and you are an important and powerful person.

[Bavcar] People are not little opportunists, but big ones, but the remedy for that opportunism is frequent elections.

[Lorenci] Are the members of your staff members of different parties? Do you know what their political orientation is?

[Bavcar] These people must not be members of any party, and they are not.

[Lorenci] But isn't the chief of the police a party leader?

[Bavcar] Distrust is a principle that is built into the democratic system. One should not act against possible abuses of trust, however, with prohibitions, but rather by establishing parliamentary, public, and other oversight. And things are different; there is the political and administrative level. Every minister in every government performs a political function, i.e., he conveys political guidelines from the parliament to the administration. That is why we decided in the law on the state administration to institute a state secretary in the Interior Ministry, a person who would ensure the continuity of expertise. That system is familiar to the Germans. They have a state secretary who has already been there for 20 years, and minister-politicians who are replaced. Even Genscher, the head of the Liberals, was an interior minister. In short, these doubts and misgivings about my party position are a bit contrived, and more the product of the current political situation than of any really major dilemma.

[Lorenci] Do the people in your staff perceive the service's political neutrality as self-evident?

[Bavcar] Yes, and let me add something very bold: In these two years, whenever officers have said, "Things are at a standstill, and they have to be implemented," I have never said no, for political or any other reasons.

[Lorenci] Is it true that you had unofficially asked within the government to leave the police ministry and get a new one?

[Bavcar] There were talks about this in the context of the personnel changes that we were then planning in the coalition, but it did not happen.

[Lorenci] Would you essentially like to leave this position?

[Bavcar] I am prepared to do anything here as well, if it is necessary. I think, however, that I have given the Slovene police the basic guidelines and that it would not be felt very much if I were to assume some other position in the government.

[Lorenci] The position of interior minister is no longer as politically profitable as it was during the police's "state-creating" period.

[Bavcar] It has never been profitable. When I decided on it, it was clear to me that I was taking a risk. I have already been in Slovene politics for some time anyway, but an episode in the interior ministry necessarily brings a person a particular sort of renown. In spite of this, I decided on this position, also in order to demonstrate that it could be handled in a different way than it had been in the past. I hope that I have succeeded in this. I am proud of these two years. And if it should happen that I could hold this office once again in a future government, I would not say no immediately.

[Lorenci] Your office is increasingly double-edged. On one hand, you keep being pushed into the center of public attention, which every politician wants. On the other hand, it is obviously more and more associated with several traps and dangers.

[Bavcar] God help me—what am I supposed to say?

[Lorenci] In which area of its activity are the police weakest? Probably in the area of economic crime?

[Bavcar] That is true, not so much because of the incompetence of the police, too few people, a lack of experience, etc., but rather primarily because of the complete legal disorder in this area. One can frequently hear some sort of demands that the police should do more and actually be a sort of general supervisor of everything that is happening in the economy. A system that needs the police to oversee the economy, however, is condemned to catastrophe. The only remedy is regulation of the legal situation. If the present situation continues, we will get into a very difficult situation. It will not be known who is supporting or corrupting whom, and several borderline criminal areas will also start to be linked to politics. This is not just because of greed and the seizure of property advantages, but also because of the situation that the economy is in; it is bursting at every seam, and it is physically seeking room for itself, but it cannot find it within the framework of this legislation. There are many cases in which we have started an investigation and concluded in the end that there are very few things that can be prosecuted in view of the existing legislation.

[Lorenci] Can you cite any symptomatic example?

[Bavcar] There is a whole bunch of cases of debatable privatization. Recently a great deal of reaction has been aroused by Krasmetal in Sezana and Hit Invest in Nova Gorica. We invested an extremely great amount of energy and also filed criminal charges in several cases (Slovin 24 charges, Elan 40, Trend several dozen...), and special groups were operating, but then everything was left up in the air. I do not know who should be asked what is happening with this.

[Lorenci] How do you explain this deadlock?

[Bavcar] I cannot, because I should not explain it, since that would be interfering in an area that is not under my jurisdiction—the judicial system.

[Lorenci] Perhaps you can explain it by political influence and fiefs within the judicial system?

[Bavcar] I appreciate your effort, but I will not say anything more in connection with this.

[Lorenci] Uncontrolled privatization is probably a characteristic example, and the most important one, of the legal disorder that you are talking about.

[Bavcar] The situation is extremely deadlocked. The blockade in parliament, and especially the opposition's negligent behavior in this regard, is creating extremely great economic damage. We need privatization more than anything else. We need a normal system, so that we will know how this society and this economy can function. We also cannot negotiate honestly with foreign countries because of this. An extremely tense relationship is arising between labor and capital. The state, with all its apparatus, is completely impotent in this regard. If it remains that way, we are facing a collapse of basic values and order. The answer to all these questions can only be given by political circles, the parliament. It is far from being, and cannot be, just the police's problem.

[Lorenci] Because of the unsettled regulations and the lack of political positions on uncontrolled privatization, are the police mostly standing idly by?

[Bavcar] No. We have filed a number of criminal charges in connection with economic crime. We have just now dealt with Slovin, Kemija Impex, Feromoto, Drzavna Zalozba Slovenije, the Trzic Trade Enterprise, Prot in Ljubljana, Mercator, Sara Ziri, Avtonabava, Tipa in Maribor, Toko in Trzic, Elita in Kranj, Iskra Inzeniring in Kranj, etc. We are thus not standing idly by. We have to be extremely careful, however, since these are often borderline cases, because we do not know where the police are doing harm and where it is in the public interest. Since there is no legislation, there is also no basic policy on crime. That lack of a state policy on crime is catastrophic, and not just in the area of economic crime. Look, for example, at what is happening with the criminal charges in connection with the recent war. We filed 71 of them, and so far 12 of them have been dealt with. They have all been either acquitted or the charges have been rejected.

[Lorenci] As police minister, can you talk about the serious disruptions in the functioning of the judicial system?

[Bavcar] I cannot.

[Lorenci] It seems that objectively the police are in a rather difficult situation. In a few short years they have jumped from one regime into another, they had to purify themselves internally somehow; during the war they acted as an army and then had to demilitarize themselves; now there are refugees, new borders, the pressure of the Balkan wars, and at the same time, increasingly

organized crime of the West-European type. Sometimes it seems that the police will collapse in light of all these burdens.

[Bavcar] They will not collapse! Even if it sounds a bit self-complacent, I can say that in this situation we are still relatively good and successful, and that we are countering the difficulties, also because we anticipated many of these things and prepared for them. We anticipated the war, and bore an extremely large part of that conflict. We received a lot of new tasks along with the new state. The citizenship project is an entirely separate problem, and there are also the other administrative matters, and the establishment of our own intelligence service without the elements of the old Security Service, etc. In some cases we are already ahead of others. Thus, for example, we are already withdrawing policemen from most of the local border crossings on the Austrian and Italian borders, and thus reducing the number of police employees. We are aware that we have already established the outlines of the new state and that we have to reduce the state administration, including the police, to a level that such a small state can support. In Maribor we recently uncovered two large criminal gangs that were terrorizing the city. There is the Jelincic case, in which we will supplement the charges with elements of criminal association. I could also list many others: the tolar counterfeiting, the Kramberger case, the Vollmeier case in Maribor.... We solved many of these cases very quickly. In short, the police will not collapse.

[Lorenci] Do you think that you will still be its minister after these elections?

[Bavcar] Since I will be in the winning coalition, I can be anything.

[Lorenci] Even prime minister?

[Bavcar] Yes (laughs).

Duty-Free Zone Along Slovene-Croatian Border

92BA1468B *Ljubljana DELO* in Slovene 19 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Marjeta Sostaric: "The Government's Decision Is Only a Temporary Forced Solution"]

[Text] *Local border 10-kilometer duty-free zone for people with property on both sides of the border; only the crops and animals owned by them are duty-free; unilateral decision.*

Ljubljana, 18 Sep—For the 240,000 residents of the districts and villages bordering on neighboring Croatia, yesterday's decision by the Slovene Government certainly brings relief. The exemption from paying duties or import fees for goods brought from the neighboring state will particularly delight those who have part of their land and other real estate on the other side of the border.

In the present situation, the government was simply led by necessity to make the unilateral decision that there would be an exemption from the payment of duties and other fees for Slovene citizens in a 10 km zone along the border with Croatia. The harvesting of the fall crops has

begun, and this is obviously a forced solution, especially since one cannot expect the situation in negotiations with neighboring Croatia to be settled very quickly. When an appropriate agreement is concluded between the two states, this decision by the Slovene Government will cease to be in effect.

As stated by Deputy Foreign Minister Vojka Ravbar, in preparing this measure they very carefully studied the situation along the border: How many obcinas and individual settlements should even be included? Who should be allowed to benefit from the privilege? etc. "There is a long list of individual obcinas and villages inhabited by people for whom the border between the states has also drawn the border through their property. On the basis of this fact, the government also decided among the proposed possibilities regarding how much of the border area it could include most effectively and help the population by exempting them from paying import duties. Then a decision was adopted that the duty exemptions would be in effect for a 10-km zone on the Slovene side, and likewise on the other side, where Slovene citizens have their property."

Under the same conditions as in local border traffic with other states on which Slovenia borders, residents along the border with Croatia, without paying duties or other fees, can bring agricultural products from their fields, forest products, and wood from their plots, and transport domestic animals and products of animal origin, but only if they are obtained from domestic animals. In the event that the competent Slovene authorities adopt a decision prohibiting the importation of specific types of animals or products from them from a specific border area in Croatia (to protect the health of animals and people in Slovenia), appropriate veterinary inspection must necessarily be conducted in returning livestock and in bringing products of animal origin from the Croatian side to our side. If such possible measures are adopted, the passage of animals and goods of animal origin will only be possible at border crossings where veterinary inspection has been organized. If the situation is normal and veterinary inspection is unnecessary, normal crossing of the border is also possible outside the border crossing. In that case, however, people with property on both sides of the border must carry personal identification or a certificate that they have property on both sides of the border, through which they can prove, in the event of a possible inspection, that they are entitled to the privileges in crossing the border.

In order to avoid abuses, residents of areas bordering Croatia, when crossing the border, will require proof that they are the owners of real estate or that they are members of the owner's family or hired workers, or the owners of herds (a list, signed in their own handwriting, of the domestic livestock, with all necessary characteristics such as sex, possible pregnancy, etc.), and also proof of permanent residence.

[Box, p 2]

The agricultural products for which owners of property on both sides will not have to pay duties also include

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grape juice and wine. For other goods that residents of the border area will bring from Croatia to Slovenia, the rule is that they will be able to bring it across duty-free if they do not resell it and if they do not bring more than the tolar equivalent value of \$30 of goods across the border at one time. According to this Slovene Government measure, agricultural and forest machinery, tools, and vehicles, with spare parts and necessary fuel and oil,

can also be brought across the border without difficulty. The same thing will also apply to all other items and equipment in the amounts necessary for processing on farms in the area bordering Croatia; from all types of fertilizer, seeds, seedlings, young trees, pesticides, and medicines for animals, to viniculture equipment, wine-cellars equipment, casks, and material for maintaining and renovating houses, etc.

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